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MAKING RACE SALIENT:
TRAYVON MARTIN AND IMPLICIT BIAS IN A
NOT YET POST-RACIAL SOCIETY*
CYNTHIA LEE **
This Article uses the Trayvon Martin shooting to examine the
operation of implicit racial bias in cases involving self-defense
claims. Judges and juries are often unaware that implicit racial
bias can influence their perceptions of threat, danger, and
suspicion in cases involving minority defendants and victims.
Failure to recognize the effects of implicit racial bias is especially
problematic in cases involving black male victims and claims of
self-defense because such bias can make the defendant’s fear of
the victim and his decision to use deadly force seem reasonable.
The effects of implicit racial bias are particularly likely to operate
under the radar screen in a society like ours that views itself as
post-racial.
Recent social science research on race salience by Samuel
Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth suggests that individuals are
more likely to overcome their implicit biases if race is made
salient than if race is simply a background factor—known but
not highlighted. Making race salient or calling attention to the
relevance of race in a given situation encourages individuals to
suppress what would otherwise be automatic, stereotypic
congruent responses in favor of acting in a more egalitarian
manner. In the Trayvon Martin case, race was made salient by
the huge public outcry over the Sanford Police Department’s
failure to arrest George Zimmerman and accusations of racial
*
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profiling, which received extensive media coverage. Most
criminal cases, however, do not receive the kind of media
attention received in the Trayvon Martin case. In most criminal
cases involving a minority defendant or victim, race is a
background factor but is not something either party tries to
highlight. The parties may think race is not relevant, or they may
fear that if they call attention to race, they will be accused of
playing the race card. Race, however, often is relevant to
questions about the reasonableness of fear, and calling attention
to race may be the best way to defuse the adverse effects of
implicit racial bias.
Building on these insights, this Article suggests that in the run-ofthe-mill case, when an individual claims he shot a young black
male in self-defense, the police, the prosecutor, the judge, and the
jury are likely to find reasonable the individual’s claim that he
felt he was being threatened by the young Black male unless
mechanisms are in place to make the operation of racial
stereotypes in the creation of fear salient. The Article concludes
with some suggestions as to how prosecutors and defense
attorneys concerned about the operation of implicit racial bias
can make race salient in the criminal courtroom.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 2012, at approximately 7:17 p.m., a seventeenyear-old Black teenager named Trayvon Martin was shot and killed
by a twenty-eight-year-old Hispanic man named George Zimmerman,
the Neighborhood Watch Captain for the Retreat at Twin Lakes
Community. 1 Minutes earlier, Zimmerman had called 911 to report
what he thought was suspicious activity. “Hey, we’ve had some breakins in my neighborhood,” Zimmerman told the dispatcher. 2 “And
there’s a real suspicious guy.” 3 Zimmerman told the 911 dispatcher
that the suspicious guy looked like he was up to no good, or as if he
was on drugs. 4 Zimmerman asked how long it would take the police
to arrive because “[t]hese assholes, they always get away.” 5
Zimmerman then told the dispatcher that the individual was starting
to run. 6 The dispatcher asked Zimmerman if he was following the
suspicious person. 7 When Zimmerman responded affirmatively, the
dispatcher told him, “O.K, we don’t need you to do that.” 8
Zimmerman’s call ended at about 7:15 p.m. 9
What happened next is hotly disputed, but one thing is clear. At
approximately 7:17 p.m., Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon
Martin. 10 Martin, who was unarmed, 11 had been walking and talking
1. Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm: In Florida, an Intersection of Tragedy,
Race and Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Melanie Jones, Trayvon Martin Case: 911 Tapes ‘Not as Conclusive as People
Think,’ Says Defense Attorney, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012, 2:56 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/trayvon-martin-case-911-tapes-not-conclusive-people-think-saysdefense-attorney-429306.
5. Barry et al., supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Report of Investigation Prepared by Officer Christopher F. Serino, Sanford Police
Dep’t 6 (Mar. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Mar. 13, 2012 Report of Investigation] (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
10. Zimmerman called 911 at around 7:11 p.m. and Martin was shot at 7:17 p.m. Id.
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on his cell phone with his girlfriend when Zimmerman first began
following him in his car. 12 When Martin began running away from
him, Zimmerman got out of his car to follow Martin on foot. 13
Apparently a scuffle ensued during which Zimmerman found himself
face up on the ground with Martin on top of him. 14 Witnesses heard
someone calling out for help before hearing the sound of gunfire. 15
Police arrived on the scene shortly after the shooting to find Martin,
who was shot once in the chest, lying face down on the grass with his
hands underneath his body. 16 Inside the front pocket of Martin’s
sweatshirt were a bag of Skittles and a large, cold can of Arizona iced
tea. 17 A black cell phone was found at the scene near Martin’s body. 18
Zimmerman told police that he shot Martin in self-defense. 19
Zimmerman was handcuffed and taken to the local police station in
Sanford, Florida, then released without charges. 20 The failure of the
Sanford Police Department to arrest Zimmerman created a firestorm
of protests. Across the country, thousands of people donned hoodies
and held candlelight vigils to demand Zimmerman’s arrest and show
support for Martin, who was wearing a dark grey hoodie sweatshirt
when he was shot. 21 Amidst the calls for justice, Florida’s “Stand
11. Ovetta Wiggins, A Rallying Cry for Justice in Teen’s Death, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
2012, at A3 (reporting that Martin was unarmed and carrying a bag of Skittles and a can of
iced tea at the time he was shot).
12. Barry et al., supra note 1; see also Wiggins, supra note 11 (noting that Zimmerman
followed Martin as he walked through the gated community).
13. Barry et al., supra note 1 (reporting that Zimmerman jumped out of his car to
pursue Martin on foot, after indicating to the 911 dispatcher that Martin was running).
14. Mar. 13, 2012 Report of Investigation, supra note 9, at 4; see also Offense Report,
Sanford Police Dep’t 14 (Feb. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Offense Report] (noting that
Zimmerman’s back appeared wet and covered in grass and Zimmerman was bleeding
from the nose and the back of the head); Narrative Report, Sanford Police Dep’t 1 (Feb.
26, 2012) (noting that the witness saw a man in a red sweatshirt on the ground getting hit
by another man who was up on top of him in a straddle position).
15. Mar. 13, 2012 Report of Investigation, supra note 9, at 4–5 (noting that a review of
the 911 calls reveals a male’s voice, determined to be Zimmerman’s, yelling “help” and
“help me” fourteen times in approximately thirty-eight seconds); see also Report of
Investigation Prepared by Officer Christopher F. Serino, Sanford Police Dep’t 2 (Mar. 18,
2012) (noting that a witness saw her neighbor talking to someone and “the kid” lying on
the ground, groaning, and saying “help me, help me”); Narrative Report, supra note 14, at
1 (Feb. 26, 2012) (stating that “[t]he guy on the bottom getting hit was yelling help”).
16. Offense Report, supra note 14, at 14.
17. Id. at 16–17.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Sari Horwitz, Zimmerman Claims Martin Started Confrontation, WASH. POST,
Mar. 27, 2012, at A2.
20. Barry et al., supra note 1.
21. NAACP Leads March on Sanford, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2012, at A3 (reporting
that thousands joined a march through Sanford demanding that Zimmerman be arrested);
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Your Ground” law, which was cited by the City of Sanford as the
reason why Zimmerman could not be arrested, became the subject of
intense scrutiny. 22
This Article uses the Trayvon Martin shooting to examine the
operation of implicit racial bias in interracial cases involving claims of
self-defense. Implicit bias is unintended bias that operates without
our conscious awareness. 23 Legal decision makers are often unaware
of the extent to which implicit racial bias can influence perceptions of
fear and reasonableness determinations in self-defense cases. The
effects of implicit bias are particularly likely to operate under the
radar in a society like ours that views itself as post-racial. 24 Many
people today believe that race no longer matters, or that it matters
too much to some people. Post-racialists, for example, view the 2008
election of Barack Obama, the nation’s first African American
president, as proof that race no longer matters and that racial
discrimination is a problem of the past. 25
The notion that we have reached a post-racial moment in our
history and therefore need not be as concerned with issues involving
race as we have been in the past is popular among both conservatives
and liberals, but is deeply misguided. Research on social cognition
Wiggins, supra note 11 (reporting that thousands have demonstrated in major cities across
the country wearing hoodies to show solidarity with Martin, who was wearing a hoodie the
night he was killed).
22. Florida’s Stand Your Ground law provides immunity to a person who uses force in
self-defense, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012), and prohibits a law enforcement
agency from arresting a person for using force “unless it determines that there is probable
cause that the force that was used was unlawful.” Id. § 776.032(2). The city of Sanford
released a letter on March 19, 2012, explaining that “law enforcement was PROHIBITED
from making an arrest based on the facts and circumstances they had at the time.” Letter
from Norton N. Bonaparte, Jr., ICMA-CM, City Manager (Mar. 19, 2012) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The city cited Florida Statute 776.032, the immunity
provision of Florida’s self-defense statute, as support for its decision not to arrest
Zimmerman.
23. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1129
(2012). “Implicit” bias is unintentional bias arising from “attitudes or stereotypes that
affect our understanding, decision-making, and behavior, without our even realizing it.”
Id. at 1126.
24. This Article uses the term “post-racial” to refer to “the notion that the United
States has reached a point where race is so infrequently salient that it no longer makes
sense to organize around it or even acknowledge its presence.” Frank Rudy Cooper, PostRacialism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 114 (2012).
25. Hua Hsu, The End of White America?, THE ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2009, at 46, 55
(“At the moment, we can call this the triumph of multiculturalism, or post-racialism.”);
Jonathan Rauch, Coming to America, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2003, at 30, 30
(“Increasingly, the Washington area is the post-racial America that we have all been told
to expect.”).
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suggests that race still matters today, although in different ways than
it mattered in the past. As the Implicit Association Test 26 has shown
over and over, race influences both our perceptions and behaviors,
often without our even knowing it. 27 Even individuals who endorse
egalitarian beliefs demonstrate implicit racial bias in favor of Whites
and against Blacks. 28 Ironically, because racial bias today is largely
implicit rather than explicit, attempts at being color-blind can
exacerbate the problem of racial bias because ignoring race can result
in the automatic engagement of stereotype-congruent responses. 29
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the belief
that our society has reached a point in history when it no longer
makes sense to focus on race and racial discrimination—the notion
that we are post-race or post-racial. The Article starts by explaining
what is meant by the term “post-racial.” It then suggests that despite
significant advances in civil rights laws and major shifts in attitudes
about race, we are not yet beyond race. The shooting of Trayvon
Martin is used as an example of how racially divided our society
remains despite the election of President Obama.
Part II examines the wide gulf between the largely egalitarian
racial attitudes that most Americans explicitly hold today and the
negative implicit racial biases that persist beneath the surface. John
Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner’s theory of aversive racism offers one
way to explain this puzzling inconsistency. 30 Under their theory,
many, if not most, Americans sincerely believe in equal treatment for
Blacks and Whites. 31 Yet despite these egalitarian beliefs, Americans
are constantly exposed to negative stereotypes about Blacks. These
stereotypes include the idea that Blacks are lazy people who would

26. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited May 7,
2013); infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part II. Like many scholars of color, I capitalize the words “White” and
“Black” to highlight the fact that Whites and Blacks are members of socially constructed
racial categories in American society. See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE, at xiii–xiv (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
1996) (discussing the social construction of race); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 53–76
(2d ed. 1994).
29. See infra notes 193–222 and accompanying text.
30. See generally Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of
Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner eds., 1986).
31. Id. at 65–66.
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rather live on or cheat welfare than work 32 and that Blacks are often
involved in criminal activity. 33
Dovidio and Gaertner posit that in situations where the racial
nature of a particular course of action is clear—in other words, if it
would be clear that one is acting in a racially biased manner—
Americans will usually choose to act in non-biased ways. 34 In cases
where one’s actions can be attributed to either racial or nonracial
factors, however, Americans will more often than not act in racially
biased ways. 35
32. During the 2012 presidential campaign, Washington Post writer Ezra Klein noted
that presidential candidate Mitt Romney ran more campaign ads about welfare than any
other issue. Ezra Klein, Race and the 2012 Election, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2012, at A12.
Romney’s ads claimed that “[u]nder Obama’s plan, you wouldn’t have to work[;] . . . they
would just send you your welfare check.” Jamelle Bouie, In New Ad, Mitt Romney Repeats
False Attack on Obama’s Welfare Policy, THE PLUM LINE, WASHINGTONPOST.COM
(Aug. 13, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/in-newad-mitt-romney-repeats-false-attack-on-obamas-welfare-policy/2012/08/13/92cda562-e54711e1-9739-eef99c5fb285_blog.html. Klein observed that this focus on welfare was puzzling
because few people at the time believed there was a problem with poor people not
wanting to work. Klein, supra. The problem in 2012, most people realized, was that
millions of Americans could not find work, no matter how hard they tried. Id. “In modern
politics, however, when a campaign begins doubling and tripling down on an unusual line
of attack, it’s because it has reams of data showing the attack is working.” Id. Political
scientist Michael Tesler found that Romney’s welfare ads primed racial resentment,
finding that the ads worked particularly well “if the viewer [was] racist, or at least ‘racially
resentful.’ ” Id. The Romney campaign may have thought this would be a good way of
encouraging racially resentful White voters to vote for Romney rather than Obama. By
focusing on welfare, the Romney campaign could play on racial stereotypes about lazy
Black people and “welfare queens.” See generally Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., The ‘Welfare
Queen’ Experiment: How Viewers React to Images of African-American Mothers on
Welfare, NIEMAN REPORTS, Summer 1999, at 49, http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/assets
/pdf/Nieman%20Reports/backissues/99summer.pdf (discussing the stereotype of welfare
mothers as mostly poor African American women who choose to be on welfare because
they fail to adhere to a set of core American values). As long as the Romney campaign
could run these ads ostensibly about welfare and not explicitly about race, they could
encourage racial resentment against Blacks in general and the President in particular.
33. The media frequently depicts young Black and Brown men as the ones who are
mugging other people, scamming people, burglarizing homes, selling drugs, and engaging
in drive-by shootings. See ROBERT M. ENTMAN, YOUNG MEN OF COLOR IN THE MEDIA:
IMAGES AND IMPACTS 13 (2006); Adeno Addis, “Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:” The
Mass Media, Law, and African Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 523, 555 (1993) (“The image
of young black males conveyed by the mainstream media is one associated with drugs,
crime, and violence.”); Leonard M. Baynes, A Time to Kill, the O.J. Simpson Trials, and
Storytelling to Juries, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 549, 550 (1997) (“[T]he image of young
violent Black men is very prevalent in the media.”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth
Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears—On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L.
REV. 503, 512 (1994) (noting that Blacks are often depicted as “violent muggers and
burglars”).
34. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 30, at 85.
35. Id.
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Building on Dovidio and Gaertner’s work, I suggest that the
initial decision by the Florida State Attorney’s Office not to charge
Zimmerman was made at a time when the racialized nature of the
case was not yet evident, and when factors other than race—such as
Florida’s Stand Your Ground law, the grass stains on Zimmerman’s
back, Zimmerman’s injuries, and Zimmerman’s status as the
Neighborhood Watch Captain—could explain the decision not to
charge George Zimmerman in the death of Trayvon Martin. Indeed,
weeks passed before the case received any significant attention in the
press. 36 Then race quickly became salient in various ways, from the
public protests over the shooting to Zimmerman’s parents’ efforts to
prove their son was not a racist. 37 Only after race became painfully
salient did the State Attorney’s Office appoint a different prosecutor
to handle the case, who then decided to charge Zimmerman with
second degree murder. 38
Part III focuses on the operation of racial stereotypes and
implicit racial bias in the self-defense context. It examines social
science studies showing that individuals are more likely to perceive an
action as aggressive, violent, and dangerous when committed by a
Black person than when the same action is committed by a White
person. 39 This Part also examines social science studies showing that
individuals are more likely to “see” a weapon in the hands of a Black
person than in the hands of a White person, even when the Black
person is actually unarmed. 40 This Part suggests that these studies
have disturbing implications for criminal cases involving claims of
self-defense against Black and Brown victims given the
reasonableness requirement in self-defense law. The defendant
claiming self-defense in the use of deadly force does not have to be
correct that he was being threatened with an imminent, unlawful
attack threatening death or serious bodily injury as long as his belief
in the need to use deadly force in self-defense was both honest and
36. Julia Dahl, Trayvon Martin Shooting: A Timeline of Events, CBS NEWS (Apr. 11,
2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57412417-504083/trayvon-martinshooting-a-timeline-of-events (noting that Zimmerman shot Martin on February 26, 2012,
but the story did not receive national attention until March 13, 2012); Charita Goshay,
Opinion, Stark Needs Your Anger More Than Sanford, Fla., CANTONREP.COM (Apr. 21,
2012), http://www.cantonrep.com/opinion/x221026909/Charita-Goshay-Stark-needs-youranger-more-than-Sanford-Fla (“It took the national media a full month to catch up to the
shooting of Trayvon Martin because a young minority male being shot long ago stopped
being news.”).
37. See supra text accompanying note 21; infra text accompanying notes 127–28.
38. Sari Horwitz, Charge Filed in Martin Killing, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1.
39. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 164–185 and accompanying text.
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reasonable. 41 If most people assume that young Black males are
armed and dangerous, then a defendant claiming that he shot a young
Black male in self-defense is more likely to be seen by the judge and
jury as having acted reasonably, even if the young Black male in
question was not in fact a threat.
Part IV relies on recent social science research on race salience
to suggest some possible reforms. Samuel Sommers, Phoebe
Ellsworth, and others have shown through empirical research that
making race salient or calling attention to the operation of racial
stereotypes encourages individuals to suppress what would otherwise
be automatic, stereotype-congruent responses and instead act in a
more egalitarian manner. 42 These studies suggest that when race is
made salient, individuals tend to treat White and Black defendants
the same. 43 When race is not made salient, individuals tend to favor
White defendants over Black defendants. 44
Building on these insights, this Part suggests that in the run-ofthe-mill case, when an individual claims he shot and killed a Black
person in self-defense, legal decision makers are likely to find
reasonable the individual’s claim that he felt his life was being
threatened unless mechanisms are in place to make the operation of
racial stereotypes in the creation of fear salient. This is especially true
if the victim is a young Black male dressed in a certain way. In the
Trayvon Martin case, race was made salient by the extensive media
coverage and the huge public outcry over the Sanford Police
Department’s failure to arrest. Most criminal cases, however, do not
receive the kind of media attention received by the Trayvon Martin
case. In most criminal cases involving a Black defendant or victim,
race is a background factor that is not highlighted by either party. The
parties may think race is irrelevant or they may fear that if they call
attention to race, they will be accused of “playing the race card.” 45
41. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.01[E] (6th ed.
2012) (“A defendant is justified in killing a supposed aggressor if the defendant's belief in
this regard is objectively reasonable, even if appearances prove to be false, i.e., even if the
decedent did not represent an imminent threat to the defendant.”).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 193–222.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 193–222.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 193–222. The race salience studies that have
been conducted thus far have focused on whether making race salient affects jury
decision-making when the race of the defendant is manipulated. They have not yet
focused on whether making race salient affects results when the victim’s race is
manipulated. Given the results of the race salience studies thus far, it seems reasonable to
infer that race salience should have race-neutralizing effects in cases where the victim’s
race is manipulated just as it does in cases where the defendant’s race is manipulated.
45. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT
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Race, however, is often relevant to questions about the
reasonableness of fear, and the recent social science research on race
salience suggests that calling attention to race may be the best way to
defuse the adverse effects of implicit racial bias.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that prosecutors and criminal
defense attorneys who are concerned about the operation of implicit
racial bias should attempt to make race salient in the criminal
courtroom. The Article provides a few concrete suggestions as to how
race can be made salient and concludes by addressing possible
objections to its proposal.
I. NOT YET POST-RACIAL
Attitudes about race in the United States today are very
complex. The country has made tremendous strides away from the
racism that was pervasive in the days of slavery, segregation, and Jim
Crow laws. 46 Oprah Winfrey, Denzel Washington, Eddie Murphy,
and countless other successful Blacks in business, law, medicine, and
politics are reminders that many Blacks have made it to the top of
American society in terms of wealth, power, and fame. 47 In 2008,
Barack Obama was elected to become the nation’s first African
American president. 48 In 2012, President Obama was re-elected to a
second term in office. 49 These developments have led many people to
BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 7 (2008) (explaining that playing the race card
involves making “dubious and questionable accusations of racism”).
46. See id. at 76–79.
47. See Neubia Williams, A Post Racial Era?: How the Election of President Obama
and Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence Illustrate that the United States Is Not Beyond the
Centrality of Race, 4 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (“Postracialists point to the historic achievement of prominent figures such as Thurgood
Marshall, Condoleezza Rice, Shelia Jackson Lee, Eric Holder, Oprah Winfrey, Colin
Powell, and, of course, President Obama, as evidence that racism no longer exists.”). But
see Mario L. Barnes, Reflections on a Dream World: Race, Post-Race and the Question of
Making It Over, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 6, 17 (2009) (arguing that the
focus on individual examples of Black success is ill-conceived given the number of Blacks
still at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder). Barnes also notes that “[p]rior to Obama,
other prominent Blacks such as Oprah Winfrey and Bill Cosby were often referenced to
prove that with hard work anyone could achieve the American dream.” Id. at 12.
48. See Barnes, supra note 47, at 12 (“Barack Obama becomes the latest and
penultimate black success story, which proves that unsuccessful Blacks merely do not
work hard enough.”); Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2010) (“The
election of Barack Obama to the presidency has inspired many to marvel at the seeming
evaporation of race as a basis for social ordering in the United States, a euphoria often
expressed in proclamations that we now live in a ‘post-racial’ America.”).
49. David A. Fahrenthold, Obama Wins, Defying Doubts About Economy, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 2012, at A1.
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believe that we are beyond race and living in a “post-racial” society. 50
Post-racialists, those who believe that race is no longer relevant and
should not be acknowledged, 51 point to these and other achievements
by Black Americans as a reason to stop focusing on race and racial
discrimination in America. 52
Sumi Cho describes post-racialism as “a twenty-first-century
ideology that reflects a belief that due to the significant racial
progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based
decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, and that civil society
should eschew race as a central organizing principle of social
action.” 53 Post-racialists believe “race does not matter, and should not
be taken into account or even noticed.” 54 Central to post-racialism is
the idea that “racial thinking and racial remedies are no longer
needed because the nation has . . . transcended racial divisions of past
generations.” 55 For post-racialists, race-based remedies are divisive
and partial to special interests. 56 Moreover, post-racialists discourage
the contemplation of race even if the intent is to remedy past
discrimination. 57 Post-racialists think we should stop obsessing over
race and recognize that we have come a long way from the days when
bigotry and racially discriminatory acts were accepted. 58 Many postracialists think we currently live in a meritocratic color-blind society. 59
The shooting of Trayvon Martin belies this claim of post-racial
triumph. It is unlikely that Zimmerman would have thought Martin
was “real suspicious,” “up to no good,” and “on drugs or something”
if Martin had been White. Race likely influenced Zimmerman’s

50. For critiques of this view, see generally Barnes, supra note 47; Sumi Cho, PostRacialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009); López, supra note 48; john a. powell,
Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785 (2009).
51. Cooper, supra note 24, at 119.
52. See Barnes, supra note 47, at 12.
53. Cho, supra note 50, at 1594.
54. Id. at 1595.
55. Id. at 1601.
56. Id. at 1602.
57. Id. at 1603 (noting that “post-racialism draws a moral equivalence between
‘racialism’ under Jim Crow which subordinated racial minorities, and the ‘racialism’ of the
civil-rights era, which sought to remedy minority subordination”).
58. Indeed, a person “who points out racial inequities risks being characterized [by
post-racialists] as an obsessed-with-race racist.” Id. at 1595.
59. Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1139, 1140 (2010). While Kang is referring to the attitudes of the politically conservative
post-racialists, i.e., the Right, in this part of his paper, he acknowledges that post-racialists
include both liberal and conservative Americans. Id. at 1141–42.
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perception that Martin posed a threat of criminality, whether
Zimmerman was aware of this or not.
Race may have also influenced the government’s decision not to
arrest Zimmerman. Had Zimmerman been an African American man
who followed and then shot an unarmed Caucasian teenager during a
fist-fight, it is unlikely that police would have released Zimmerman
without any charges. 60 When there is a dead victim and police know
who killed the victim, they usually arrest the obvious perpetrator of
the homicide and then investigate. 61
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law, which prohibits Florida law
enforcement personnel from arresting a person for using force unless
they first determine that there is probable cause to believe that the
force used was unlawful, 62 should not have prevented an arrest in this
case. 63 Arguably, there was probable cause to believe that
60. Benjamin Crump, the attorney hired by Trayvon Martin’s family, questioned the
impartiality of the police investigation, noting that the police ran a background check on
Trayvon Martin but did not run a background check on George Zimmerman, even though
Martin was dead. CNN Special Report with Soledad O’Brien, Beyond Trayvon: Race and
Justice in America (CNN television broadcast Mar. 31, 2012) [hereinafter CNN Special
Report with Soledad O’Brien], transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com
/TRANSCRIPTS/1203/31/se.01.html. Crump told Soledad O’Brien,
They ran a background check on Trayvon who is dead on the ground. They don’t
run a background check on the guy who just shot and killed the kid in cold blood.
In essence, what they did, they said that Zimmerman, your word is more credible,
and we’re going to accept that, . . . [and] this little thug on the ground, . . . he really
doesn’t deserve a fair and impartial investigation.
Id.; see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, Focusing on What’s Important in the Trayvon Martin Case,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2012 1:00 PM), www.theatlantic.com/national/print/2012/04
/focusing-on-whats-important-in-the-trayvon-martin-case/255629/
(reporting
that
Zimmerman was not subjected to a background check until after he was released from
custody).
61. ‘I Used to Be Him,’: Former Federal Prosecutor Paul Butler on Why the Trayvon
Martin Case Resonates with Him, Countdown with Keith Olberman (Current TV broadcast
Mar. 29, 2012), available at http://current.com/shows/countdown/videos/i-used-to-be-himformer-federal-prosecutor-paul-butler-on-why-the-trayvon-martin-case-resonates-withhim (featuring former federal prosecutor Paul Butler, noting that it was surprising that the
police did not arrest Zimmerman after finding him standing over Martin with a gun, given
the fairly low standard of probable cause needed to arrest). In this case, perhaps because
of his work as the Neighborhood Watch Captain, police trusted Zimmerman enough to
release him pending their investigation.
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).
63. While Florida’s Stand Your Ground law should not have prevented an arrest, the
fact that it gives a person claiming self-defense the benefit of the doubt may have helped
Zimmerman avoid arrest. A Florida newspaper studied nearly 200 cases involving people
who had invoked the state’s Stand Your Ground law, and found that nearly seventy
percent of defendants claiming self-defense “went free.” Kris Hundley et al., Florida
‘Stand Your Ground’ Law Yields Some Shocking Outcomes Depending on How Law Is
Applied,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(June
3,
2012,
10:25
AM),
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Zimmerman’s use of deadly force was unlawful. 64 Martin was at least
twenty pounds lighter than Zimmerman. 65 Moreover, Zimmerman
used a gun against Martin, who was unarmed. 66
The public’s reaction to the shooting was sharply divided along
racial lines, hardly what one would expect in a post-racial society
where race does not, or should not, matter. A Washington Post-ABC
News poll conducted on April 5, 2012, reported a huge divide
between Blacks and Whites over whether the shooting was justified. 67
Eighty percent of Blacks surveyed said they thought the killing of
Martin was unjustified, while only thirty-eight percent of Whites
surveyed felt the same way. 68
Even more telling was the racial divide in the reaction to
President Obama’s comments on the shooting. President Obama’s
remark—“I can only imagine what these parents are going
through . . . . If I had a son, he’d look like Trayvon” 69—triggered
harsh reaction from conservatives. Then-presidential candidate Rick
www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1233133.ece. Disturbingly, the race of
the victim appears to have some effect on whether a person claiming self-defense faces
criminal punishment for his acts. Seventy-three percent of Floridians who killed a Black
person faced no penalty under Florida’s Stand Your Ground law compared to fifty-nine
percent of those who killed a White person. Id.
64. Probable cause to arrest is usually defined as reasonable grounds to believe that a
crime has been committed and that A, the arrestee, committed it. See People v. Roach, 253
N.Y.S.2d 24, 29 (1964) (noting that probable cause to arrest exists if an officer has
reasonable grounds for believing both that a felony has been committed and that the
person arrested committed it); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “probable cause” as “[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person has
committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with
a crime”). Ordinarily, as long as police have probable cause to arrest, they may arrest an
individual. Florida’s self-defense statute, however, requires reasonable grounds to believe
that the force used by an individual claiming self-defense was unlawful before police can
arrest that individual. § 776.032(2).
65. While some sources indicate that Martin weighed 150 pounds and Zimmerman
weighed 170 pounds, see Barry et al., supra note 1, the police report depicted an even
wider range in the men’s physical sizes, stating that Martin weighed 160 pounds and
Zimmerman weighed 200 pounds. Offense Report, supra note 14, at 2, 4.
66. Barry et al., supra note 1. Apparently, the lead investigator on the scene wanted to
arrest Zimmerman, but was instructed by the State Attorney’s Office that there was not
enough evidence to pursue a conviction. Matt Gutman, Trayvon Martin Investigator
Wanted
Manslaughter
Charge,
ABC
NEWS
(Mar.
27,
2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-investigator-wanted-charge-georgezimmerman-manslaughter/story?id=16011674.
67. Krissah Thompson & Jon Cohen, Poll Finds Sharp Racial Divides over Martin
Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2012, at A3.
68. Id. Most Whites said they did not have enough information about the shooting to
say whether it was unjustified. Id.
69. Krissah Thompson & Scott Wilson, ‘If I Had a Son, He’d Look Like Trayvon’,
WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2012, at A1.
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Santorum accused the President of employing “divisive rhetoric.” 70
Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, another candidate for
president at the time, went so far as to suggest that the President’s
words meant he would not care if a White child had been shot. 71 Even
though President Obama was careful not to criticize the Sanford
Police Department for failing to arrest Zimmerman, having faced the
bite of public criticism for his comments after the Cambridge Police
Department’s arrest of Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 72 a
Newsweek poll taken shortly after President Obama’s remarks found
that a majority of Whites disapproved of the way President Obama
handled the shooting of Martin. 73
In sharp contrast, Black leaders praised the President’s
comments. The Reverend Al Sharpton remarked, “It really brings
home to people that this kid is not some potential thug in a hoodie.” 74
Benjamin Crump, the attorney representing Trayvon Martin’s
parents, said his clients were “humbled by Obama’s comments.”75
Similarly, Benjamin Jealous, President of the NAACP, commented,
“Obama’s words spoke both to the universal pain felt about this case,
and the specific pain felt by the family and the need for our nation to
look at itself in the mirror.” 76
Post-racialists may be right that we have come a long way, but
they are not correct when they claim that race no longer matters and
70. Andrew Romano & Allison Samuels, Is Obama Making It Worse? An Exclusive
Newsweek Poll Reveals the Persistence of America’s Stark Racial Divide, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
16, 2012, at 40, 42.
71. Id.
72. Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The
False Equivalence Between Officer and Citizen, 11 NEV. L.J. 1, 12 n.116 (2010) (noting that
President Obama suffered a significant drop in his poll numbers after he remarked that
the Cambridge police acted stupidly in arresting Gates). Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
is an African American professor who has been on the Harvard faculty for nearly two
decades. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE ARREST OF
HENRY LOUIS GATES JR. AND RACE, CLASS, AND CRIME IN AMERICA 15, 37 (2010). He
was arrested for disorderly conduct by Sgt. James Crowley, a Cambridge, Massachusetts
police officer, after forcibly entering his own home because of a jammed door. See Abby
Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2009, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21gates.html. Professor
Gates was arrested even though he provided Sgt. Crowley with his Harvard ID card and
his driver’s license, which confirmed that he was a Harvard professor and that he lived at
the house, apparently because Professor Gates refused to step outside onto the porch
when Sgt. Crowley requested that he do so. See OGLETREE, supra, at 33, 37.
73. Romano & Samuels, supra note 70, at 42 (“According to the Newsweek poll, a
majority of whites now disapprove of Obama’s handling of the Martin tragedy.”).
74. Thompson & Wilson, supra note 69.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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thus should not be acknowledged. 77 The nation’s response to the
shooting of Trayvon Martin reinforces the fact that even today,
Blacks and Whites can experience and perceive the same exact events
in vastly different ways. The events leading up to and following the
shooting of Trayvon Martin also suggest that we have not yet
achieved a post-racial society. 78 Indeed, race still matters, even to
people who do not wish for it to matter. As discussed in the next
Section, while many Americans today believe it is wrong to
intentionally discriminate on the basis of race and to treat people
differently based on the color of their skin, implicit racial bias in favor
of Whites and against Blacks persists. 79 Our implicit biases can be and
often are completely the opposite of our consciously held beliefs. 80
II. AVERSIVE RACISM: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN POSITIVE
EGALITARIAN BELIEFS AND NEGATIVE IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS
Racial norms in American society today are very different from
the racial norms of days past when it was socially acceptable to
express negative views about Blacks. 81 Historically, many Whites
viewed Blacks as inferior and were not afraid to express prejudicial
attitudes in the company of others. Today, most Americans know that
77. As Mario Barnes notes, “If African Americans have, indeed, finally made it over,
there are many in our community that have not received the notice.” Barnes, supra note
47, at 11.
78. This Article does not claim that the reaction to the shooting and President
Obama’s remarks “proves” that the United States is not a post-racial society. Others have
devoted entire law review articles to demonstrating that the United States is not postracial. See supra note 50. This Article merely uses the reaction to the Trayvon Martin
shooting as an example of American society not yet being post-race.
79. See infra notes 84–106 and accompanying text. An Associated Press poll found
that racial prejudice against Blacks has increased since 2008, the year that Barack Obama
was elected president, with a majority of Americans today expressing negative views about
Blacks. Sonya Ross & Jennifer Agiesta, AP Poll: Majority Harbor Prejudice Against
Blacks, THE BIG STORY (Oct. 27, 2012, 4:13 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-pollmajority-harbor-prejudice-against-blacks. Fifty-one percent of Americans today openly
express anti-Black attitudes, compared to forty-eight percent in a similar 2008 survey. Id.
When racial bias was measured implicitly, the poll found that fifty-six percent of
Americans demonstrated implicit racial bias against Blacks, compared to forty-nine
percent in 2008. Id. Anti-Hispanic bias today is quite pronounced as well. A 2011 survey
found that fifty-two percent of non-Hispanics surveyed openly expressed anti-Hispanic
attitudes. Id. When measured implicitly, that figure rose to fifty-seven percent. Id.
80. See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 69, 158 (2013); supra note 23 and accompanying text.
81. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An
Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 202 (2001) (noting that “racial norms in society have
shifted dramatically”).
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it is socially unacceptable to say things that appear to manifest
prejudice or bias against Blacks. 82 Americans of many different
political stripes and colors sincerely believe it is wrong to discriminate
on the basis of race and that Blacks should be treated the same as
Whites. By and large, Americans embrace the egalitarian race norms
that are enunciated in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 83 If we are talking about the social norms that many, if
not most, Americans believe ought to be embraced, race norms today
are decidedly more egalitarian than discriminatory.
Despite our largely egalitarian attitudes and beliefs, social
science research over the past decade has shown that a majority of
Americans are implicitly biased against Blacks. 84 Researchers have
demonstrated the existence of implicit bias through the Implicit
Association Test (“IAT”), 85 a simple test that measures the amount of
time individuals take to make an association with an image or word
they view on a computer screen. 86 When individuals are asked to pair
words and images that are consistent with widely held attitudes or
stereotypes, i.e. schema-consistent words and images, their response
times are fairly quick. 87 When they are asked to pair words and
images that are inconsistent with widely known stereotypes, i.e.,
schema-inconsistent words and images, their response times become
noticeably slower. 88
One of the initial tests measuring implicit bias was completely
race neutral. Individuals were shown various words representing
flowers, insects, pleasant words, and unpleasant words, and asked to
sort these words into the appropriate category. 89 For example, if the
individual saw the word “rose,” the individual would hit the key
corresponding with the label “flower.” 90 If the individual saw the
82. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know
About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 997, 1011 (2003).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. See infra notes 85–106.
85. See generally Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and
Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101 (2002) (discussing results
of over 600,000 IAT tasks that demonstrate implicit preferences for White over Black and
young over old and stereotypical associations linking males with science and career and
females with liberal arts and family).
86. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1509–10 (2005).
87. See Kang et al., supra note 23, at 1130.
88. Id.
89. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464,
1465–68 (1998).
90. Id.
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word “rotten,” the individual would hit the key corresponding with
the label “unpleasant word.” 91
In the second phase of the experiment, individuals were again
shown various words representing flowers, insects, pleasant words,
and unpleasant words, and were told to hit one key on the computer
if the word on the screen fell into the category of “flower” or
“pleasant word” and to hit another key on the computer if the word
on the screen fell into the category of “insect” or “unpleasant
word.” 92 Their response times were measured and most individuals
were able to quickly complete the first two parts of the experiment. 93
In the third phase of the experiment, the same individuals were
again shown words representing flowers, insects, pleasant words, and
unpleasant words. This time, they were told to hit one key if the word
on the screen fell into the category of “flower” or “unpleasant word”
and to hit another key on the keyboard if the word on the screen fell
into the category of “insect” or “pleasant word.” 94 This time, their
response times were much slower. Researchers theorized that
response times were slower in the third experiment because people
are accustomed to associating flowers with pleasant things and insects
with dirty or negative things. 95
The experiment prompted researchers to test whether
individuals would react similarly if instead of flowers and insects, they
were shown White-sounding names, such as Katie and Meredith, and
Black-sounding names, such as LaTonya and Ebony. 96 Individuals in
this experiment were asked to hit one key if they saw either a Whitesounding name or a word reflecting something pleasant or nice and to
hit another key if they saw either a Black-sounding name or a word
reflecting something unpleasant or negative. 97 Response times in this
condition were fairly quick. 98 In the next phase of this experiment,
individuals were asked to hit one key if they saw either a Whitesounding name or an unpleasant word and to hit another key if they
saw either a Black-sounding name or a pleasant word. 99 This time,
just as in the previous experiment when individuals were asked to
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 1466–67.
Id. at 1465–68.
Id.
Id. at 1469–70.
Id. at 1473–74.
Id. at 1465.
See id. at 1467.
Id. at 1473–74.
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pair insects with pleasant words and flowers with unpleasant words,
response times were much slower. 100 Even individuals who selfreported non-prejudiced beliefs manifested implicit racial bias in
favor of Whites and against Blacks. 101
Numerous other experiments have been conducted since these
initial experiments, confirming that implicit racial bias against Blacks
is pervasive. 102 Over fourteen million IATs, measuring various kinds
of biases, including bias based on gender, sexuality, and age, have
been completed. 103 Seventy-five percent of those who have taken the
race IAT have demonstrated implicit racial bias in favor of Whites. 104
Even African Americans manifested implicit bias in favor of Whites
over Blacks. 105
John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner suggest one way to
understand the disparity between the largely positive, explicit and the
largely negative, implicit racial attitudes toward Blacks. Under their
theory of aversive racism, individuals in today’s society are averse to
explicit manifestations of racism, but they are nonetheless still racially
biased against Blacks. 106 “Whites are socialized to believe that racism
100. Id. at 1474.
101. See id. at 1475.
102. See Kang et al., supra note 23, at 1139, 1144–45; Justin D. Levinson et al., Implicit
Racial Bias: A Social Science Overview, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 19–
24 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
103. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 80, at 69; see also Melinda Henneberger,
Beware the ‘Mindbugs’ that Infect You with Prejudices, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2013, at A2
(noting that some 14 million people have taken the IATs developed by scholars Mahzarin
Banaji, Anthony Greenwald, and Brian Nosek to measure implicit racial bias). This is
double the number of IATs completed just three years earlier. See Jerry Kang & Kristin
Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465,
473 (2010) (“With over seven million completed tests, Project Implicit comprises the
largest available repository of implicit social cognition data.”).
104. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 80, at 47.
105. See Henneberger, supra note 103 (noting that Banaji and Greenwald’s research
found that about forty percent of African Americans have a pro-White bias, forty percent
have a pro-Black bias, and twenty percent are neutral); see also Robert W. Livingston, The
Role of Perceived Negativity in the Moderation of African Americans’ Implicit and Explicit
Racial Attitudes, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 405, 411 (2002) (discussing the
relationship between Blacks’ implicit and explicit racial attitudes and finding that Blacks
who perceived negativity from Whites showed a positive correlation with in-group explicit
bias and a negative correlation with in-group implicit bias); Nosek et al., supra note 85, at
105 (analyzing the overall IAT effect revealing respondents’ “automatic preference for
White relative to Black”).
106. See generally Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 30 (introducing empirical support
for the concept of aversive racism as ambivalent, complex feelings toward racial minorities
marked by unacknowledged negative feelings and beliefs); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism] (demonstrating how aversive racism
affects racial minorities and influences interracial relations).
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and discrimination are wrong, but society reinforces and maintains
negative stereotypes regarding Blacks.” 107 To match the egalitarian
race norms that are prevalent in today’s society, most Americans will
try to avoid appearing racist in situations when it would be obvious to
others that they are acting in a racially biased manner. 108 When the
racial nature of the situation is salient or obvious, individuals are
reminded that their actions could be seen as racist, and they are more
likely to try to act in accordance with egalitarian principles. 109 If,
however, there is some ambiguity about whether their actions would
appear to others to be biased, they are more likely to respond in
biased ways. 110
The Florida State Attorney’s Office’s reaction to the shooting of
Trayvon Martin provides support for Dovidio and Gaertner’s theory
of aversive racism. Just after the shooting, there was ambiguity about
whether the decision not to arrest Zimmerman would appear to the
public to be a racially biased decision. Many young Black men are
shot and killed in both intra-racial and interracial disputes that never
make the evening news. Whether the perpetrators are caught and
arrested rarely catches the attention of anyone besides the victim’s
friends and family. The initial decision by the State Attorney’s Office
not to arrest Zimmerman was probably made without much thought
to the racially charged nature of the shooting. 111 Zimmerman, as the
Neighborhood Watch captain, was likely viewed by police at the time
as an upstanding citizen. 112 Florida’s law on self-defense largely
107. Donald O. Bucolo & Ellen S. Cohn, Playing the Race Card: Making Race Salient
in Defence Opening and Closing Statements, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.
293, 295 (2010).
108. Id.
109. Dovidio & Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 106, at 7.
110. Bucolo & Cohn, supra note 107, at 295.
111. Law professor Tamara Lawson, a former prosecutor, notes that due to the “proof
challenges and procedural obstacles” involved in Stand Your Ground cases, “it would be
normal for a prosecutor to be cautious before charging this type of case, and it may even
be reasonable for the prosecutor to elect not to charge it after weighing all the factors.”
Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon
Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the Prosecutor’s Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground
Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271 (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 20) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
112. Barry et al., supra note 1 (providing biographical information on Trayvon Martin
and George Zimmerman). According to one source, Zimmerman was not subjected to a
criminal background check until after he was released from custody. See Coates, supra
note 60. The assumption that Zimmerman was an upright, honest citizen was called into
question after Zimmerman was charged and then released on bond. In July 2012, a Florida
judge found that “Zimmerman misled the court about his finances during an initial April
2012 bond hearing.” Lizette Alvarez, New Bond of $1 Million in Trayvon Martin Killing,
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favored citizens claiming self-defense. 113 There was also evidence
suggesting Zimmerman and Martin were in a physical altercation
before Martin was shot. 114 Whoever made the initial decision not to
charge Zimmerman probably did not think this was a case that would
ignite racial protest. As we now know, however, that assumption
turned out to be incorrect.
Zimmerman’s shooting of Martin quickly became a symbol of
racial profiling run amok. Racial profiling is a term of art usually used
to describe police or government action that appears to be racially
biased. 115 When a police officer pulls over a Black driver ostensibly
for a minor traffic violation, but actually pulls the driver over because
the officer has a hunch, based on the driver’s race or ethnicity, that
the driver is engaged in some kind of criminal activity, the officer has
engaged in racial profiling. 116 The practice has become so common, it

N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2012, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/us
/zimmerman-granted-1-million-bond.html?_r=0. The judge also found evidence suggesting
that Zimmerman was preparing to flee the United States to avoid prosecution. Id.
113. See supra note 22. While racially neutral on its face, the law apparently has been
applied in racially disparate ways. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 14.
115. David Harris, one of the nation’s leading experts on racial profiling, defines racial
profiling “as law enforcement’s use of racial, ethnic, or religious appearance as one factor,
among others, to decide who to stop, question, search, or otherwise investigate.” “Ending
Racial Profiling in America”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights and Human Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. 2 (2012), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-4-17HarrisTestimony.pdf (testimony of David A.
Harris, Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Associate Dean for Research, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law); see also SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 161
(Cynthia Lee ed., 2011) (describing racial profiling as “the practice by law enforcement
officials of detaining individuals based at least in part on their race, ethnicity, or national
origin”).
116. In 1996, the Supreme Court held that such action does not violate the Fourth
Amendment as long as the officer had probable cause to believe the driver committed a
traffic violation. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (opining that
“subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis”). More recently, the Court affirmed Whren when it upheld a provision in
Arizona’s controversial law aimed at combating illegal immigration that requires police
officers to investigate the immigration status of a person stopped if there is reasonable
suspicion that the person “is unlawfully in the United States.” See Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509–10 (2012) (rejecting preemption challenge brought by the
United States to section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, the provision requiring Arizona state police
officers to investigate the immigration status of persons detained if there is reasonable
suspicion that the person is unlawfully in the United States); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 11-1051(B) (Supp. 2012) (“For any lawful stop, detention, or arrest made by a law
enforcement official . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is
unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person . . . .”).
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is called “Driving While Black.” 117 Many viewed Zimmerman’s
shooting of Trayvon Martin as an example of racial profiling by a
private citizen, given Zimmerman’s statement to the 911 operator
that he thought Martin looked suspicious, was up to no good, or was
on drugs. 118 As Tamara Lawson notes, “[T]he outrage surrounding
Trayvon Martin’s death . . . was focused on the perceived injustice
and lack of apparent consequences for killing a young Black (male)
teen. This narrative projected a suggestion of racial bias as the
unspoken motivation for the prosecutor’s initial leniency.” 119
Indeed, once the racialized nature of the case became evident, it
was not just African Americans who condemned the shooting. Many
Whites spoke publicly and forcefully against Zimmerman’s actions. 120
For example, Joe Scarborough, anchor of MSNBC’s morning news
television broadcast Morning Joe, suggested that if Zimmerman had
been Black and Martin had been White, the case would have been
handled much differently:
If anybody watching this show . . . doesn’t believe that if an
African-American shot a 17-year-old white boy walking
through a neighborhood carrying ice tea and Skittles . . . if they
do not believe that an arraignment would be scheduled by the
next morning for the African-American shooter and that the
white boy’s family would be called immediately . . . that an
officer would actually drive to the white boy’s home and sit
down with the parents on the couch and console them because
they have lost a 17-year-old son. If you . . . believe that this case
and the handling of this case by the people in Florida had
nothing to do with race, you are living in a fantasy world. 121

117. Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 425
(1997); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546, 570
(1997); see also Paul Butler, “Walking While Black:” Encounters with the Police on My
Street, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23 (describing experience of being followed by
Washington, D.C., police while walking in his own neighborhood).
118. See Jones, supra note 4.
119. Lawson, supra note 111 (manuscript at 25).
120. See id. (manuscript at 15–16) (describing the reactions taken by African
Americans as well as prominent White Americans in response to the Martin killing); CNN
Special Report with Soledad O’Brien, supra note 60.
121. Lawson, supra note 111 (manuscript at 16 n.39) (citing Drew Katchen,
Scarborough and Morning Joe Panel on Shooting of Trayvon Martin, MSNBC (Mar. 21,
2012), http://mojoe.msnbc.com/_news/2012/03/21/10790499-scarborough-and-morning-joepanel-on-shooting-of-trayvon-martin?lite); see also Mark Caputo, Joe Scarborough:
Sanford Police Chief, Prosecutor ‘Acted Shamefully, Should Be Forced from Office’ in
Trayvon
Martin
Case,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Mar.
21,
2012),
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Although many individuals spoke out in support of Martin,
others expressed the view that Martin was partly to blame for the
events leading up to his death. Geraldo Rivera, a Latino talk show
host and commentator on Fox News, sparked a debate over whether
Martin’s decision to wear a hoodie was to blame for Martin’s death
when he told viewers, “[T]he hoodie is as much responsible for
Trayvon Martin’s death as George Zimmerman was.” 122 Rivera
repeated these sentiments when he later warned Black and Brown
parents not to allow their sons to wear hooded sweatshirts because
really bad criminals wear hoodies. 123
Rivera’s hoodie comment was quickly condemned. 124 During a
rally in Sanford, Florida, on March 31, 2012, the Reverend Jesse L.
Jackson told the crowd, “This is not about a hoodie, it’s about racial
profiling.” 125 Making a similar point, Representative Bobby Rush,
while speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives,
removed his suit jacket to reveal a grey hoodie, donned dark
sunglasses, and told his colleagues, “Racial profiling has got to
stop. . . . Just because someone wears a hoodie does not make them a
hoodlum.” 126
Another way race became salient in this case was through the
efforts of George Zimmerman’s family to prove that Zimmerman was
not a racist. Zimmerman’s friends and family repeatedly told the
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2012/03/joe-scarborough-sanford-policechief-prosecutor-acted-shamefully-should-be-forced-from-office-in-tra.html (calling on
Florida state government officials to make an arrest in response to Martin’s shooting); Joe
Scarborough on Trayvon Martin: Failure to Arrest Killer Is ‘Disgusting’ and ‘Shameful’,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/26/joescarborough-video_n_1379706.html (calling for law enforcement in Florida to arrest
Zimmerman).
122. Katherine Boyle, The Hoodie Label, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2012, at C1.
123. Id.
124. See MJ Lee, Jesse Jackson Knocks Geraldo Rivera ‘Hoodie’ Comment, POLITICO
(Mar. 23, 2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.politico.com//news/stories/0312/74410.html; see also
Ediberto Roman, An Open Letter to Geraldo Rivera, THE BLOG, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 26, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ediberto-roman/geraldo-riverahoodie_b_1376453.html (noting that in associating hoodies with urban criminals and thugs,
Rivera’s comments reinforced negative stereotypes about young African American and
Latino urban youth as dangerous, violent criminals).
125. Protestors March Where Trayvon Martin Was Shot, WPVI.COM (Apr. 1, 2012),
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/6at4/story?section=news/national_world&id=8602898.
126. Sari Horwitz & Rosalind Helderman, Fla. Teen’s Father Details Police Account,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2012, at A2. In response to Congressman Rush’s demonstration,
Representative Greg Harper, who was presiding over the floor, began to pound his gavel
and shout that Representative Rush was out of order for wearing a hoodie, ostensibly on
the ground that the rules prohibit representatives from wearing hats inside the chamber.
Id.
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press that Zimmerman was not a racist. 127 Zimmerman’s attorney
pointed out that Zimmerman and his wife mentored two African
American boys for free. 128
Focusing on whether Zimmerman is a racist is misguided. The
social science research demonstrates that one does not have to be a
Racist with a capital R, or one who intentionally discriminates against
Blacks on the basis of race, to harbor implicit racial bias. 129 Even
individuals who strongly believe in egalitarian principles can be
implicitly biased in favor of Whites and against Blacks. 130 It is unlikely
that George Zimmerman set out that night intending to kill a Black
person, but implicit bias likely influenced him to see Martin as
someone who looked suspicious and dangerous. 131

127. See Sari Horwitz, Charge Filed in Martin Killing, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2012, at
A1; CNN Special Report with Soledad O’Brien, supra note 60 (showing video clips of
George Zimmerman’s neighbor, his friend, and his father, claiming that Zimmerman is not
a racist); Julia Dahl, Trayvon Martin Case: Zimmerman’s Father Tells a Newspaper His
Son Is Not Racist, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 2012, 11:10 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301504083_162-57398745-504083/trayvon-martin-case-george-zimmermans-father-tells-anewspaper-his-son-is-not-a-racist.
128. See David Muir & Olivia Katrandjian, Trayvon Martin Killing: George
Zimmerman’s Attorney and Friend Speak Out, ABC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmermans-attorney-friend-speak-trayvon-martinincident/story?id=15999256 (noting that Craig Sonner, Zimmerman’s attorney, insisted
that Zimmerman is not a racist, pointing out that he and his wife mentored two black
children for free); Zimmerman Lawyer: No Racial Issue with Client, CBS NEWS (Mar. 24,
2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505266_162-57403854/zimmerman-lawyerno-racial-issue-with-client (noting that Zimmerman’s attorney told the press that
Zimmerman and his wife had served as mentors to an African American single mother
with a teenage son and daughter).
129. The social science research suggests that there is often an inverse correlation
between the explicit racial attitudes and the implicit racial biases of individuals who view
themselves as liberal or progressive. See Levinson et al., supra note 102, at 17–18; Nosek et
al., supra note 85, at 106. For individuals who view themselves as conservative, there is
usually a tighter correlation between their explicit racial attitudes and their implicit racial
biases. See Nosek et al., supra note 85.
130. See Patricia G. Devine et al., Prejudice With and Without Compunction, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 829 (1991).
131. Unfortunately, the law still operates on the assumption that racial bias is
something that can be easily controlled and therefore punishes only intentional
discriminators. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that proof of
intent to discriminate is necessary for an equal protection violation and that proof of
racially discriminatory impact alone is not sufficient). Under the perpetrator model of
racism, the law presumes that racism is the result of intentional discrimination. Alan
David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054–55 (1978); see
also Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407,
1412 (1990) (noting that antidiscrimination law punishes only “perpetrators who have
purposely and intentionally caused harm to identifiable victims”).
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The fact that Zimmerman may have mentored African American
boys and had African American friends does not negate the fact that
implicit racial bias could have led him to think Trayvon Martin was a
criminal. As Song Richardson and Phillip Goff point out, “[N]ormal
psychological processes that operate below the level of conscious
awareness . . . could have affected [Zimmerman’s] judgment that
Martin posed a threat—regardless of Zimmerman’s conscious racial
beliefs.” 132
Zimmerman’s family also put forth Zimmerman’s ethnic identity
as another reason to doubt that race had anything to do with the case.
To correct the initial impression that Zimmerman was a racist White
man, Zimmerman’s family told the press that Zimmerman was a
minority himself. 133 Zimmerman’s father wrote a letter to the Orlando
Sentinel explaining that his son is “a Spanish-speaking minority.” 134 It
is not clear whether Zimmerman self-identified as White or Hispanic
before the shooting. Zimmerman’s father is White 135 and his mother is
from Peru, 136 so Zimmerman is of mixed descent and could have
chosen to embrace either or both identities.
Zimmerman’s status as an ethnic minority is not a sufficient
reason in and of itself to discount the influence of implicit bias in this
case. 137 As African American writer Michaela Angela Davis observes,
“A young man could be susceptible to the influence of [the image of
the black man as a symbol of violence, fear and deviant behavior]
whether his ‘mother is from Peru or Norway.’ ” 138 Thinking that
Zimmerman’s status as an ethnic minority insulates him from any
claim of racial bias feeds into the myth that Latinos are “a multiracial
people incapable of racial discrimination,” but as Tanya Hernandez
points out, “Racism, in particular anti-Black racism, is a pervasive
and historically entrenched fact of life in Latin America and the
132. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion
Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 317 (2012).
133. See Manuel Roig-Franzia et al., Who is George Zimmerman?, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 2012, at A1.
134. Id.
135. See id. (noting that neighbors say Zimmerman’s father is White and his mother is
Latina).
136. See Barry et al., supra note 1 (noting that Zimmerman’s mother, Gladys, is a
Peruvian immigrant who worked as a deputy clerk).
137. See Eugene Robinson, Editorial, Perils of Walking While Black, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23, 2012, at A19 (noting that it does not matter that Zimmerman himself is a member
of a minority group because the problem was not his race or ethnicity, but “the hair-trigger
assumption he made that ‘black male’ equals ‘up to no good’ ”).
138. Roig-Franzia et al., supra note 133 (“You being a minority doesn’t make you
immune to racist beliefs.”).
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Caribbean.” 139 Light skin and European features are prized while
darker skin and African features are disparaged. 140 People who
migrate from Latin America and the Caribbean come to the United
States “with their culture of anti-Black racism well intact,” and “this
facet of Latino culture is transmitted . . . to younger generations.” 141
According to social science studies of Latino racial attitudes, both
recent immigrants from Latin America and well-established Latinos
in the United States prefer to maintain social distance from African
Americans. 142 Young Latinos are often the perpetrators of anti-Black
hate crimes in the United States. 143
Viewing young Black males with suspicion occurs even within
the Black community. As Gregory Taylor of Upper Marlboro,
Maryland, told the Washington Post:
Even in my own black community, we do the same thing. If I’m
at the Bowie Town Center, and there’s a whole group of black
men hanging out talking, my initial reaction is not one of fear,
but suspicion. And that’s one of the things that cuts me if I had
to be honest. Those of us who have achieved a level of success
and moved out of the ’hood, we even have those suspicions.
Some is real, and some is just the same stereotypes perpetrated
on us relentlessly by the media. 144
The point is that any one of us could have seen Trayvon Martin
the way George Zimmerman saw him the night of February 26, 2012.
As Donna Britt notes, many people saw Zimmerman as a monster
who killed an unarmed kid; it’s easy to despise a monster but “what’s
hard is seeing the subtle ways we may be like [Zimmerman].” 145
Once the racialized nature of the shooting was evident, the State
Attorney’s Office reversed course and appointed a new prosecutor to
handle the case. 146 More than six weeks after he shot and killed
Trayvon Martin, George Zimmerman was charged with second

139. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination and the
“Diversity” Defense, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259, 265, 268 (2007).
140. Id. at 268–69.
141. Id. at 270.
142. Id. at 271.
143. Id. at 275.
144. Lonnae O’Neal Parker, ‘This Could Have Been Our Kids’, WASH. POST, Mar. 23,
2012, at C1.
145. Donna Britt, Distance, Then Tears over Trayvon, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2012, at
C7.
146. See Lizette Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-Degree
Murder in Shooting of Martin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1.
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degree murder and taken into custody. 147 Continuing to leave
Zimmerman at large was no longer a viable option for the State
Attorney’s Office as it became crystal clear that the public saw the
failure to arrest and charge Zimmerman as a racially biased
decision. 148 Arguably, race salience encouraged the ultimate decision
to file charges against Zimmerman, a decision that should have been
made from the beginning.
III. RACE, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE PERCEPTION OF FEAR
Implicit racial bias against African Americans has roots in
pervasive, negative stereotypes about Blacks, which are “perpetuated
within our culture in subtle, yet highly effectual, ways.” 149 A
stereotype is “a well-learned set of associations that link a set of
characteristics with a group label.” 150 While most Americans are
aware of negative stereotypes about Blacks, “only a subset of these
individuals actually endorse the stereotypes.” 151 Rejection of negative
racial stereotypes, however, does not eliminate these stereotypes
from one’s knowledge structure. 152 As Jody Armour notes, “Because
stereotypes are established in children’s memories at an early age and
constantly reinforced through the mass media and other socializing
agents, stereotype-congruent responses may persist long after a
person has sincerely renounced prejudice.” 153
The Trayvon Martin shooting reminds us that Blacks in general,
and young Black men in particular, are subjects of the “Black-asCriminal stereotype.” 154 This stereotype links Blacks with violence,
147. See id.
148. See Lawson, supra note 111 (manuscript at 28) (finding that arresting Zimmerman
was “in the interest of the majority group to promote the appearance of race-neutral
impartiality, fairness, and justice in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion”).
149. Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliott, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1149 (1995).
According to one source, 37.5% of 2,223 participants surveyed “believed that 60 percent
or more of the people arrested for violent crimes in the preceding year were Black, when
in fact Blacks accounted for only 38.4 percent of violent-crime arrests.” Touré, Inside the
Racist Mind, TIME (May 7, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article
/0,9171,2113166,00.html.
150. Devine & Elliott, supra note 149, at 1140. Beliefs, in contrast to stereotypes, “are
propositions that are endorsed and accepted as true.” Id.
151. Id. Highly prejudiced individuals are those whose beliefs about Blacks are largely
congruent with stereotypes about Blacks. Id. Low-prejudiced individuals are those who
reject negative stereotypes about Blacks. Id.
152. Id.
153. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 743 (1995).
154. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 138–46 (2003)
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dangerousness, and criminality. 155 The existence of this stereotype has
been documented by social psychologists for over half a century. 156
Not only are individuals more likely to perceive mildly aggressive
behavior as more threatening when performed by a Black person
than when performed by a White person, 157 they are also more likely
to see hostility in African American faces than in White faces. 158
While the Black-as-Criminal stereotype is more likely to be activated
from a young Black male wearing baggy pants, a t-shirt, and a skull
cap or a hoodie, 159 even well-dressed Black men and women have
found themselves the objects of suspicion by taxi drivers who refuse
to stop for them; 160 store clerks who follow their every move; 161
[hereinafter LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN] (explaining in detail the
“Black-as-Criminal” stereotype); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward
a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 402–23 (1996)
[hereinafter Lee, Race and Self-Defense].
155. See Lee, Race and Self-Defense, supra note 154, at 403.
156. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,
87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004).
157. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 590, 595 (1976) (finding that seventy-five percent of individuals observing a
Black person shoving a White person thought the shove constituted “violent” behavior,
while only seventeen percent of individuals observing a White person shoving a Black
person characterized the shove as “violent” behavior and forty-two percent characterized
the interaction as “playing around”); see also H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield,
Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously
Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 596 (1980) (finding that both
Black and White children tended to rate relatively innocuous behavior by Blacks as more
threatening than similar behavior by Whites).
158. See Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social
Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 345 (2004) (finding that faces displaying relatively hostile expressions
were categorized as African American by individuals with high prejudice); Kurt
Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 643 (2003) (concluding that individuals
with high implicit racial bias saw hostility as appearing more quickly and lingering longer
in African American faces than in Caucasian faces).
159. See Arelis R. Hernandez, Hoodie Campaign Aims to Change Stereotypes, SUNSENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 14, 2012, at 4B (noting that everyone wears hoodies,
but when Black people wear hoodies, “it’s interpreted as a symbol of criminal activity”);
see also Racial Stereotypes in GTA SA, REVIEWS UNIVERSE (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://www.reviewsuniverse.com/racial-stereotypes-in-gta-sa (discussing various racial
stereotypes depicted in the action adventure simulation video game, Grand Theft Auto,
such as the Black drug dealer who “is always wearing a black skull cap, black vest, baggy
jeans, [and] a chain”).
160. See CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS, at x (1993) (describing the infuriating
experience of not being able to hail a taxicab in New York).
161. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 127–28 (1987).
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women who, clutching their purses, cross the street to avoid an
imagined possible mugging; 162 and women who avoid getting on the
same elevator with them. 163
Of particular relevance in the self-defense context, several
studies have documented the phenomenon of shooter bias in which
individuals are quicker to identify weapons and slower to recognize
harmless objects, like tools, in the hands of Black persons than in the
hands of White persons. 164 For example, B. Keith Payne developed an
experiment in which participants were instructed to respond to
objects that appeared before them. 165 A human face flashed just
before each object appeared. 166 Participants were instructed to ignore
the face and simply respond to the objects. 167 In one version of the
experiment, participants were allowed to respond at their own pace. 168
In the other version, participants had to respond within a half second
of seeing the object. 169
162. See Justin Hansford, On Trayvon Martin and the Cost of Suspicion, CRITICAL
LEGAL THINKING (Apr. 11, 2012), http://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/04/11
/on-trayvon-martin-and-the-cost-of-suspicion.
163. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law
Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 46, 49–50 (1990).
164. See David M. Amodio et al., Neural Signals for the Detection of Unintentional
Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 88, 90 (2004) (finding that participants were quicker to
identify guns following Black faces than following White faces and slower to identify tools
following Black faces compared with White faces); Eberhardt et al., supra note 156, at
889–90 (finding that exposure to Black faces lowered the perceptual threshold for
recognizing guns and knives, regardless of the individual’s explicit racial attitudes);
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to
Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 403 (2003) (finding that the
race of the target affected the ability of individuals to distinguish weapons from harmless
objects and resulted in a tendency to shoot Blacks); Charles M. Judd et al., Automatic
Stereotype v. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon
Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75, 80 (2004) (finding that AfricanAmerican faces facilitate the categorization of both negatively valenced handguns and
positively valenced sports-related objects, and concluding that automatic stereotypic
associations are more influential than negative prejudice toward African-Americans); see
also B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and
Cognitive Control in Race-based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 384, 394–95 (2002) (discussing another study where participants misidentified
harmless objects as weapons when exposed to Black faces and misidentified weapons as
nonthreatening objects when exposed to White faces).
165. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
181, 184 (2001); B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended
Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006) [hereinafter
Payne, Weapon Bias].
166. Payne, Weapon Bias, supra note 165, at 287.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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In the first version of the experiment, accuracy was fairly high
regardless of race. 170 Participants, however, more quickly detected
guns when primed with a Black face than when primed with a White
face. 171 In the second version of the experiment, when participants
had to respond right away, they falsely saw a gun “more often when
the face was black than when it was white.” 172
Payne theorized that two things contributed to the tendency to
“see” a weapon in the hands of an unarmed Black person: (1) the
stereotype that links Blacks to violence and weapons, and (2) the lack
of intentional control over their responses in the second version of
the experiment when participants had to make a snap judgment
decision. 173 Negative stereotypes about Blacks were more likely to
lead to behavioral errors when the participant was forced to make a
quick decision. 174
In another experiment, Joshua Correll and others developed a
video game depicting a series of background and target images. 175 In
some of the scenes, the target was holding a gun. In other scenes, the
target was holding a harmless object. 176 Participants were instructed
to push a button on the right labeled shoot if they thought the target
was holding a gun and to push a button on the left labeled don’t shoot
if they thought the target was holding something other than a gun,
and to do so as quickly as possible. 177 If the participant was correct
and shot a target holding a gun, the participant earned ten points. 178 If
the participant was correct about not shooting a target holding a
harmless object, the participant earned five points. 179 If the
participant shot a target holding a harmless object, he was punished
by minus twenty points, and if he did not shoot a target with a gun, he
was punished by minus forty points. 180 This payoff matrix was
designed to replicate the incentives faced “by police officers on the
street, where shooting an innocent suspect is a terrible mistake (as in
170. Id.
171. Id. (suggesting “that the black face readied people to detect a gun but did not
distort their decisions”).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 288–89.
174. Id. at 289.
175. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1315 (2002).
176. Id. at 1315.
177. Id. at 1316–17.
178. Id. at 1317.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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the case of Amadou Diallo, described below), but where the stronger
motivation is presumably to avoid misidentifying an armed and
hostile target, which could result in an officer’s death.” 181 To
incentivize participants to respond quickly, researchers told
participants that if they failed to respond within a certain time period,
they would suffer a loss of ten points. 182
Correll and his fellow researchers found that both White and
Black participants fired at armed Black targets more quickly than
armed White targets. 183 They also found that White and Black
participants made the decision not to shoot an unarmed target faster
if he was White than if he was Black. 184 Their research demonstrated
that the Black-as-Criminal stereotype produces shooter bias, a bias in
favor of shooting Black persons, and that even African Americans
have this bias. 185 If African Americans demonstrate shooter bias, then
presumably Latinos, Asian Americans, and other minorities, who are
not likely to have an in-group preference for African Americans, are
also more likely to “see” a weapon in the hands of an unarmed
African American.
This empirical research has disturbing implications for selfdefense cases. In self-defense cases, a critical question is whether the
defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force in self-defense was
reasonable. 186 A defendant claiming self-defense to defend against a
homicide charge will only be acquitted if the jury finds that the
defendant honestly and reasonably believed it was necessary to use
deadly force to protect against an imminent, unlawful threat of death
or serious bodily injury. 187 If most individuals would be more likely to
“see” a weapon in the hands of an unarmed Black person than in the
hands of an unarmed White person and are thus more likely to shoot
an unarmed Black person when they would not shoot a similarly
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1327; accord Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials and the Decision
to Shoot: The Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 120, 127 (2006) (concluding in part that “racial cues promote biased shooting
behavior because . . . Black targets seem more threatening than White targets”).
186. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, § 18.01[E]; Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the
Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards
of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (1998);
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual
Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 200 (1998).
187. See Lee, supra note 186, at 195–96 (discussing the elements of the defense of selfdefense).
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situated White person, then jurors in self-defense cases may also be
more likely to find that an individual who says he shot an unarmed
Black person in self-defense because he believed the victim was about
to kill or seriously injure him acted reasonably, even if he was
mistaken. Jurors are unlikely to realize that negative stereotypes
about Blacks may be influencing their evaluation of the
reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs and actions unless they are
made aware of this possibility.
In the Amadou Diallo case, for example, four New York City
police detectives mistakenly thought that a twenty-two-year-old
immigrant from West Africa was a rape suspect reaching for his gun,
when Diallo was actually an innocent man reaching for his wallet. 188
The officers fired forty-one bullets at Diallo, continuing to fire even
after Diallo collapsed to the ground. 189 At their trial for second
degree murder, the officers argued that they were justified in shooting
Diallo because they honestly and reasonably believed he was
reaching for a gun. 190 A jury of eight Whites and four Blacks acquitted
the officers of all charges, presumably because they found that the
officers acted reasonably under the circumstances. 191
The shooter bias studies discussed above provide strong evidence
that individuals are quicker to associate Black individuals with
weapons and to perceive Blacks as armed and dangerous, regardless
of whether they are actually armed and dangerous. Given this strong
tendency to associate Blacks with weapons, it may have been more
likely that Zimmerman jumped to the conclusion that Martin’s
movements were life-threatening when he might not have perceived
those same movements as life-threatening if they had come from a
White person. While punching Zimmerman, Martin’s hands
presumably came close to Zimmerman’s stomach area. Zimmerman
may have thought Martin was attempting to reach for Zimmerman’s
gun 192 when perhaps Martin had no such intention.
188. See Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1; see also Cynthia Lee, “But I Thought He Had a Gun”: Race
and Police Use of Deadly Force, 2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 1–2 (2004)
(describing in detail the events surrounding the Diallo case).
189. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Perils of Safety, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1999, at 50, 50
(noting that nineteen of the forty-one bullets fired entered Diallo’s body).
190. See John J. Goldman, 4 White Officers Are Acquitted in Death of Diallo, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1.
191. See id.
192. See David K. Li, Zimmerman Tells Cops Trayvon Martin Reached for His Gun as
Police Tapes Released, N.Y. POST, June 21, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/f/news
/national/zimmerman_tells_cops_trayvon_martin_McSJd59PkDJfTcZP3CYVzH#axzz2IlV
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IV. MAKING RACE SALIENT
Recent social science research suggests one way to reduce the
effects of implicit racial bias—by making race salient. Samuel
Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth have been at the forefront of this
research. Their work suggests that making race salient can encourage
individuals with egalitarian beliefs and values to consciously suppress
stereotype-congruent responses that would otherwise be automatic. 193
Making race salient does not mean simply making jurors aware of the
defendant’s or victim’s race. 194 Race salience means making jurors
aware of racial issues that can bias their decision-making, like the
operation of racial stereotypes. 195
Sommers and Ellsworth theorize that when race is made salient
at trial, this activates the egalitarian racial attitudes held by White
jurors as a normative ideal. 196 In previous eras, racial norms
encouraged overtly anti-Black prejudice. 197 In modern America,
however, most Whites embrace an egalitarian value system, and
therefore will try to behave in a non-prejudiced manner, at least when
reminded to do so. 198 When racial issues are highlighted, this reminds
K6rmY. If Martin did reach for Zimmerman’s gun (and there is no way of knowing
whether he actually did since Martin is dead), he may have done so to protect his own life
by preventing Zimmerman from using it. Martin certainly would have had reason to fear
getting shot by Zimmerman since Zimmerman had followed Martin and confronted him
for no apparent reason. Because of Zimmerman’s preconceived notion that Martin was a
criminal, however, Zimmerman may have perceived Martin’s movements as more
dangerous and violent than they actually were.
193. See generally Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 82 (finding that presenting jurors
with race relevant voir dire questions in cases involving interracial violence reduced racial
bias in White jurors); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom:
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1367 (2000) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom] (finding
that in interracial domestic violence cases, White jurors were more likely to treat White
and Black defendants the same if the defendant referred to himself as a White or Black
man when speaking to his girlfriend than if he simply referred to himself as a man);
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making:
Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599
(2009) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making]
(summarizing authors’ previous research on race salience); Sommers & Ellsworth, supra
note 81 (finding that White jurors were more likely to treat White and Black defendants
equally if a defense witness spoke about the White or Black defendant being the subject of
racial slurs).
194. See Sommers & Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making, supra note
193, at 603–04.
195. See id. at 601.
196. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 81, at 203.
197. See id. at 204 (providing examples of everyday activities which slaves were banned
from doing, such as smoking in public and defending themselves in an assault).
198. See id. at 209–10 (discussing experiments in which White jurors were less likely to
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White jurors of the need to act without prejudice. 199 Contrary to the
common intuition that racial prejudice is more likely to be triggered
in racially charged cases, 200 and therefore, it is best to deemphasize
race, Sommers and Ellsworth argue that White jurors are more likely
to demonstrate racial bias against a Black defendant in cases where
racial issues are not highlighted. 201 They explain: “When race is an
obvious issue at trial, White jurors may be on guard against racial
bias. However, in trials without salient racial issues, White jurors may
be less likely to monitor their behavior for signs of prejudice, and
therefore more likely to render judgments tainted by racial bias.” 202In
several studies, Sommers and Ellsworth found evidence of White
juror bias when race was not salient, but no such evidence of bias
when race was salient. 203 For example, in one study, participants were
given a written summary of a domestic assault case in which the
defendant was accused of slapping his girlfriend in a bar and knocking
her down. 204 Half the participants received a trial summary where the
defendant was a White male who slapped his Black girlfriend; the
other half received the same trial summary, except the defendant in
their case was a Black man who slapped his White girlfriend. 205
Sommers and Ellsworth manipulated just one condition besides the
race of the parties. In the race-salient condition, the defendant yelled,
“You know better than to talk that way about a White (or Black)
man in front of his friends,” at his girlfriend just before slapping
her 206: In the non-race-salient condition, the defendant yelled, “You
know better than to talk that way about a man in front of his friends
. . . .” 207
Sommers and Ellsworth found that in the race-salient condition,
where the defendant referred explicitly to his race, mock jurors rated
the White and Black defendants equally guilty, as they should have
since the fact patterns were identical and the only difference was the
show prejudice when reminded of the importance of race in the case).
199. See id. at 210.
200. See Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 86 (1993) (“Among the case
attributes that might cause jurors of different racial backgrounds to assess evidence in
criminal cases differently are ‘racially charged’ accusations or defenses . . . .”).
201. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 81, at 209–10 (summarizing the results of
several studies showing the effect that race has on White jurors).
202. Id. at 210.
203. See id. at 210–12.
204. See id. at 212.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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race of the defendant. 208 In the non-race-salient condition, where the
defendant did not refer to his race, mock jurors were much more
likely to convict the Black defendant. 209 In these cases, even though
the conditions were identical except for the defendant’s race,
participants rated the prosecution’s case against the Black defendant
as stronger than the prosecution’s identical case against the White
defendant. 210 Participants also rated the defense case presented on
behalf of the Black defendant “as significantly weaker than the White
defendant’s defense,” even though the defense arguments were
identical in both cases. 211 White jurors also rated the Black defendant
as “significantly more . . . aggressive than the White defendant” and
perceived the White defendant as “more honest and moral than the
Black defendant.” 212 No such pattern of bias was found when race was
made salient. 213
What is important to note is that making race salient seems to
even the scales. When race is salient, jurors tend to treat similarly
situated Black and White defendants the same, as they should when
the facts are identical in both cases and the only difference is the race
of the defendant. Making race salient does not give the Black
defendant an advantage over the similarly situated White defendant.
Failing to make race salient, however, seems to lead to unequal
treatment of similarly situated defendants, with the Black defendant
receiving the short end of the stick.
In another study, Sommers and Ellsworth gave mock jurors a
written trial summary about “a high school basketball player charged
with one count of battery with serious bodily injury after an
altercation with a teammate in the locker room.” 214 The prosecution
argued that “the defendant was upset over losing his place in the
starting line-up and attacked his replacement.” 215 The defendant
admitted that he “confronted his teammate in the locker room, but
claimed that when [another teammate] stepped in and tried to
restrain him, [he] panicked and tried to break free,” accidentally
injuring his replacement in the process. 216

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 213.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
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To make race salient, Sommers and Ellsworth had a defense
witness testify that the defendant was one of only two Whites (or
Blacks) on the team and had been the “subject of racial remarks and
unfair criticism” from many of his teammates. 217 In the non-racesalient version of the case, “the same defense witness testified that the
defendant had only one other friend on the team and had been the
‘subject of obscene remarks and unfair criticism’ from many of his
teammates.” 218
Sommers and Ellsworth found that when race was not made
salient, White jurors were more willing to convict the Black
defendant than the identical White defendant. 219 In the non-racesalient condition, White jurors also recommended a harsher sentence
for the Black defendant than for the White defendant. 220
Additionally, jurors viewed the White defendant’s defense as stronger
than the Black defendant’s defense even though their arguments were
identical. 221 In contrast, when race was made a salient issue at trial,
White jurors convicted the Black and White defendants at
approximately the same rates. 222
These studies suggest that making race salient evens the playing
field, encouraging jurors to treat similarly situated Black and White
defendants the same. Making race salient does not give Black
defendants an unfair advantage over White defendants. However,
when race is not made salient, jurors do not treat similarly situated
Black and White defendants alike. In the non-race-salient condition,
White defendants benefit by the lack of attention to race.
The research on race salience suggests that it is important to
highlight the relevance of race and make jurors aware of the
possibility of racial bias if one is concerned that implicit racial bias
might result in unfair treatment of either a Black defendant or a
Black victim. Below, this Part turns to some suggestions as to how
attorneys concerned about implicit racial bias can make race salient. I
then address possible objections to my proposal to make race salient
as a model for reform.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 217.
See id. at 219.
See id.
See id. at 217.
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A. Voir Dire
It is often said that a trial is won or lost at the jury selection
stage. 223 This is because the composition of the jury greatly influences
how the jury perceives the evidence. 224 Voir dire thus presents an
important way for an attorney to make race salient. 225 Voir dire is the
process of questioning prospective jurors during jury selection in
order to enable the attorneys to make intelligent decisions about
which prospective jurors they should try to strike. 226 An attorney
223. See, e.g., Margaret Covington, Jury Selection: Innovative Approaches to Both Civil
and Criminal Litigation, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 575, 575 (1985) (“Experienced trial lawyers
agree that the jury selection process is the single most important aspect of the trial
proceedings.”); Herald Price Fahringer, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . .”: Body Language,
Intuition, and the Art of Jury Selection, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197, 197 (1993) (noting
that “[a]cknowledged experts in the field believe that eighty-five percent of the cases
litigated are won or lost when the jury is selected”).
224. See Covington, supra note 223, at 576 (stating that “jurors bring to the courtroom
biases and predispositions which largely determine the outcome of the case”).
225. While variation exists from court to court, judge-conducted voir dire appears to be
the norm in federal courts while attorney-conducted voir dire is more common in state
courts. See GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY
IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 27 (2007). But see GORDON
BERMANT & JOHN SHAPARD, THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, JUROR CHALLENGES,
AND ADVERSARY ADVOCACY 19 (1978) (noting that there is no requirement that voir
dire be judge-directed in federal court and some states require judges to conduct voir dire,
so the commonly held belief that judge-directed voir dire is the norm in federal courts and
attorney-directed voir dire is the norm in state courts is not completely true).
226. Attorneys have the right to challenge an unlimited number of prospective jurors
for cause. 1-14 CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK ¶ 14.02[5][c][i] (2008). Cause exists if the
prospective juror cannot be fair and impartial. Id. Attorneys may also exercise a limited
number of peremptory challenges. Id. Traditionally, the peremptory challenge allowed an
attorney to strike a prospective juror for any reason or no reason at all. The Supreme
Court, however, has held that attorneys may not use their peremptory challenges to strike
prospective jurors on the basis of race or gender. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146
(1994) (extending Batson to gender); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992)
(extending Batson to criminal defense attorneys); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88–89
(1986) (holding that race is not a valid reason for asserting a preemptory challenge). For
additional information about for-cause challenges, see Maureen A. Howard, Taking the
High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 379–80 (2010) (explaining that “[a] for-cause challenge must be based
on specific, demonstrable, and legally cognizable evidence of juror partiality” and that
“[t]he number of for-cause challenges is unlimited in both state and federal courts”);
Janeen Kerper, The Art and Ethics of Jury Selection, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 24–25
(2000) (noting that the usual basis for a challenge for cause is “the juror's inability to be
fair and impartial” but that “many other reasons exist for excusing jurors for cause, such as
physical disability, impaired hearing, inability to understand English, illiteracy, and the
like”). For additional information about peremptory challenges, see Carol A. Chase &
Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge for Cause Against Peremptory Challenges in Criminal
Proceedings, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 507, 508 (1997) (“[P]eremptory
challenges give parties the right to eliminate a limited number of jurors without stating a
specific reason.”).
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concerned about implicit racial bias can ask the judge for permission
to question the prospective jurors about racial bias. 227 If the attorney
is in a jurisdiction where the judge conducts the voir dire and will not
permit attorney-directed voir dire, the attorney can instead request
permission to give prospective jurors a questionnaire that presents
race relevant questions. 228
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed the
question of whether there is a constitutional right to voir dire into
racial bias. In a few early cases, the Court seemed to suggest that a
Black defendant in a racially charged case has a due process right to
question prospective jurors on racial bias during voir dire. For
example, in 1931, the Court reversed the first-degree murder
conviction and death sentence of a Black defendant charged with
murdering a White police officer, holding that the trial court erred in
denying defense counsel’s request to question prospective jurors
about the possibility of racial bias. 229 In 1973, the Court in Ham v.
South Carolina 230 held that a trial judge’s refusal to grant a Black
defendant’s request for voir dire on the subject of racial prejudice
violated the defendant’s due process rights. 231
In 1976, the Court retreated from its earlier rulings. In Ristaino v.
Ross, 232 the Court held that voir dire into racial prejudice was not
constitutionally required in a case involving a Black defendant
charged with a violent crime against a White victim. 233 Similarly, in
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 234 the Court found no error in the trial
court’s refusal to ask prospective jurors whether they would consider
race or Mexican descent of the defendant in their evaluation of the

227. See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 601 (2006) (opining that even if its potential to
diagnose bias in prospective jurors is limited, race-related voir dire may still be useful by
serving as “another way in which racial issues and concerns about prejudice [can be] made
salient for jurors”).
228. See Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 82, at 1026–29 (finding that the presence of
race-relevant questions on a jury questionnaire reduced White mock jurors’ racial bias).
229. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 309–10, 315 (1931).
230. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
231. Id. at 527.
232. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
233. Id. at 589 (“Absent circumstances comparable in significance to those existing in
Ham v. South Carolina, examination of veniremen during voir dire about racial prejudice
is held not constitutionally required.” (citation omitted)).
234. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
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case where defendant of Mexican descent was charged with smuggling
Mexican aliens into the United States. 235
In 1986, the Court again addressed the issue of voir dire into
racial bias in Turner v. Murray. 236 This time, however, the Court held
that “a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to
have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and
questioned on the issue of racial bias” when the defendant has
specifically requested such voir dire. 237 Since Turner v. Murray
involved an interracial crime of violence and is the Court’s last
statement on the issue of voir dire into racial bias, it appears that the
only time when a defendant is entitled to voir dire into racial bias as a
matter of due process is when the defendant is charged with a capital
offense, the offense is an interracial crime of violence, and the
defendant specifically requests such voir dire. 238 The Court has never
considered whether the prosecutor has a right to voir dire into racial
bias.
Even though the due process right to voir dire into racial bias
appears to be limited to death penalty cases involving crimes of
interracial violence when the defendant has specifically requested
such voir dire, voir dire into racial bias is not prohibited in other
cases. It remains within the discretion of the trial court to permit or
disallow such voir dire. 239 If permitted to engage in voir dire into racial
bias, an attorney would be wise not to start by asking prospective
jurors whether any of them are racially biased. A question like this is
likely to offend the prospective juror who may interpret such a
question as an inquiry into whether the prospective juror is a racist. 240
Instead, an attorney might start by trying to set the venire at ease
before questioning them about their racial attitudes. The attorney’s
primary goal should be to educate the venire about the workings of
implicit bias. 241 The attorney should also aim to highlight the
significance of race in the case at hand—to make race salient so that
235. Id. at 184, 192.
236. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
237. Id. at 36–37.
238. Id.
239. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (“Voir dire ‘is conducted under the
supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound
discretion.’ ” (quoting Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895))).
240. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160–61 (1989)
(arguing that voir dire into racial bias is minimally useful, insulting, and patronizing).
241. See Sommers, supra note 227, at 601 (arguing that the goal is less to ferret out
racially biased jurors and more to make race salient).
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those who end up on the jury will be more cognizant of the ways in
which race may have shaped the perceptions of the individuals
involved in the case and the ways in which race may influence the
jurors’ own perceptions.
Making race salient in this way was done very effectively in a
criminal case out of Alaska. In that case, a criminal defense attorney
representing a Black, male teenager charged with assaulting a White,
male classmate started her voir dire by sharing a story about
herself. 242 The attorney described seeing a young Black male “driving
an expensive BMW and thinking ‘drug dealer rather than’ doctor’s
son.” 243 Hearing an attorney recounting a personal experience like
this and admitting to her own racial bias gives prospective jurors
“permission to admit their own stereotyp[ical] thinking.” 244 It also
“diffuses the emotional content of the race discussion.” 245 If an
attorney does not have a personal story to share, another way she can
put prospective jurors at ease about their own implicit biases is to
share the fact that even Jesse Jackson, a well-known African
American civil rights activist, openly admits, “There is nothing more
painful for me at this stage of my life, than to walk down the street
and hear footsteps and start to think about robbery, and then look
around and see somebody white, and feel relieved.” 246
B.

Opening Statements

If jury selection is the most important stage of the trial
proceedings, the next most important phase is probably the opening
statement. 247 Good trial attorneys often use the opening statement to
tell a compelling story about what happened and why. 248 If the
attorney can tell a story that makes sense to the jury, the jury will be
242. See James McComas & Cynthia Strout, Combating the Effects of Racial
Stereotyping in Criminal Cases, CHAMPION, August 1999, at 22, 22–23.
243. Id. at 23.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Kathryn Holmes Snedaker, Storytelling in Opening Statements: Framing the
Argumentation of the Trial, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 15, 15 (1986) (noting that “[t]he
opening statement can be one of the most important phases of the persuasion process and
the most significant aspect of any trial”); Joseph Sorrentino, Power and Prejudice in
Opening Statements, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 29, 2013, at 1, 1 (discussing the importance of
opening statements).
248. See Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 565 (1991) (noting that “winning the battle of stories in the
opening statements may help determine what evidence is attended to, how it is
interpreted, and what is recalled both during and after the trial”).
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more inclined to see the facts in a way that fits that story. 249 Thus, if
an attorney is concerned that implicit racial bias may adversely affect
the verdict, he may wish to tell a story that makes race salient in his
opening statement.
In a case involving a claim of self-defense by a non-Black
defendant against a Black victim, the prosecutor may be concerned
that stereotypes about Blacks may lead jurors to see the victim as
more dangerous, aggressive, or violent than they otherwise would. To
counter such stereotypes, the prosecutor may want to emphasize in
his opening statement the ways in which racial stereotypes may have
influenced the defendant’s belief that the victim posed a threat and
the actions of the defendant that may have helped provoke the
conflict. For example, in the Zimmerman case, the prosecutor may
want to emphasize the fact that Zimmerman saw a young Black male
walking in his neighborhood, and for no apparent reason began
following that person, first in his car, then on foot, even after a 911
dispatcher told him this was not necessary. 250 The prosecutor may
wish to mention that the young Black male, Martin, was wearing a
hoodie, and that stereotypes about young Black men as gang
members who wear hoodies may have triggered Zimmerman’s
suspicions. 251 Additionally, the prosecutor may wish to highlight the
fact that Zimmerman initiated the confrontation by demanding that
Martin tell him what he was doing in the neighborhood. 252
C.

Lay Witness Testimony

Using lay witness testimony to highlight the racialized nature of
the case is another way race can be made salient to the jury. 253 If the
249. See Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and the
Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 429, 435 (stating that “most people
process information by assembling it into plausible ‘stories,’ and then draw their final
conclusions according to which of a set of possible stories makes the most narrative
sense”); see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521, 523 (1991) (arguing that “jurors
impose a narrative story organization on trial information” and “[t]he story that is
accepted is the one that provides the greatest coverage of the evidence and is the most
coherent”).
250. See Barry et al., supra note 1.
251. Boyle, supra note 122 (noting that “the word ‘hoodie’ has echoes of racial
overtones”).
252. See Barry et al., supra note 1.
253. See Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 193, at 1373.
(discussing a study where race was made salient through the victim’s testimony regarding
words that the defendant shouted at her referring to his status as a Black man); Sommers
& Ellsworth, supra note 81, at 214–15 (discussing a study where race was made salient
through the testimony of a defense witness regarding remarks made about the defendant
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defendant made reference to the victim’s race or called the victim a
racial slur in front of witnesses, the prosecution could call these
witnesses to the stand to testify about these remarks. In one study,
Ellen Cohn and others found that a defense witness’s testimony about
racial slurs shouted at the defendant by the victims reduced racial bias
in jurors. 254 Mock jurors were shown a videotape of an actual trial
involving a Black man charged with attempted vehicular
manslaughter. 255 According to the facts brought out at trial, the
defendant and his wife “were approaching their car after a football
game when they noticed an emblem was missing from the exterior of
[their] vehicle.” 256 Someone standing by their car accosted the
defendant and his wife, claiming no one had touched the car. 257 The
defendant got into his car and quickly drove off, striking three White
individuals in the process. 258 The defendant was charged with
attempted vehicular manslaughter. 259 In the race-salient version of the
trial, the defendant’s wife testified that during the incident, a crowd of
White persons surrounded her and her husband, shouting racial slurs
(“[t]his nigger thinks he’s a cop”) and attacking their car. 260 In the
non-race salient version of the trial, jurors were not presented with
this testimony. 261 Cohn found that making race salient by informing
jurors of the racial slurs that were yelled at the defendant reduced
racial bias in White jurors. 262 Racial bias was reduced even in jurors
who scored highly on tests measuring racism. 263

by other team members).
254. See Ellen S. Cohn et al., Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and
Racial Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1953, 1966 (2009).
255. See id. at 1958–59.
256. Id. at 1959.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 1964 (finding that “making race salient reduced White juror racial bias,
making the conviction rate approximately 50%,” whereas “when race was not made
salient, the conviction rate increased to 66%”).
263. The tests measuring racism included the Old-Fashioned Racism Scale, which
measures overt forms of prejudice, and the Modern Racism Scale, which measures more
subtle forms of prejudice. Id. at 1959–60, 1966 (“The fact that there was no association
between the scale and juror verdicts when race was made salient suggests that perhaps
even highly racist individuals are made cognizant of appearing racist in cases in which race
is made salient.”).
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D. Expert Witness Testimony
Another way an attorney can make race salient is by calling an
expert witness to testify about the extensive social science research
that has been conducted on implicit bias. Calling expert witnesses can
be quite expensive, so this may not be a feasible option in every case.
If a party has the resources, that party can retain a social psychologist
who can discuss the differences between explicit and implicit bias and
how implicit bias can be and has been measured. The expert witness
may also be able to testify about the shooter bias studies discussed
above, demonstrating that individuals have a bias toward shooting
Black individuals over White individuals, and the equalizing effects of
making race salient.
Whether the trial court will permit such expert witness testimony
lies within the court’s discretion. 264 When it comes to expert
witnesses, the trial court serves as gatekeeper and must be convinced
that the proffered testimony is relevant and reliable. 265 If opposing
counsel objects to the proffered testimony on relevance or reliability
grounds, 266 the attorney wishing to call the expert witness can respond
with several arguments. She may explain that just as expert witnesses
have provided helpful information to juries on matters such as
“eyewitness unreliability, post-traumatic stress disorders, or crosscultural differences in the meaning of behavior,” the expert witness
testimony that she is proffering will provide the jury with helpful
“information about the social and psychological context in which
contested adjudicative facts occurred” and “knowledge about the
context will help the [jury] interpret the contested adjudicative
264. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (holding that the trial
judge determines whether to allow an expert witness to testify based on a finding of
relevance and reliability).
265. Id. at 597 (holding that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge acts as
a gatekeeper who must “ensur[e] that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand”).
266. FED. R. EVID. 702(c). In weighing whether to sustain such objections, Rule 702
provides the trial judge with a framework for assessing the relevance and reliability of
expert witness testimony.
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.
Id.
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facts.” 267 In other words, the expert witness will provide what has
been called “social framework evidence,” which can aid the jury in
interpreting disputed facts. 268 The claim that implicit bias research is
not reliable can be countered by referencing the work of Anthony
Greenwald, Jerry Kang, and Justin Levinson and Robert Smith,
synthesizing and explaining the numerous studies that have been
conducted on implicit bias. 269
E.

Jury Instructions

Another way race can be made salient is through jury
instructions. 270 For example, U.S. District Court Judge Mark Bennett
expressly tells jurors in his courtroom that they should not rely on
implicit biases:
Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.” As we
discussed in jury selection, everyone, including me, has feelings,

267. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 133 (1989) (discussing Laurens
Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73
VA. L. REV. 559 (1987)). While acknowledging concerns about the risk of undue
prejudice, Vidmar and Schuller tentatively conclude that “juries can utilize social
framework evidence in a legally appropriate manner.” Id. at 134.
268. See id. at 138 (explaining that “social framework evidence can be defined solely by
its function: to supply the [jury] with information about some aspect of human behavior to
aid in interpreting disputed facts”). Furthermore, as Vidmar and Schuller elaborate, “The
purpose of social framework evidence, as with any expert evidence, is to assist the trier of
fact by providing information that is either unknown to the trier or potentially at variance
with what the trier believes to be true.” Id. at 139.
269. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 17 (2009) (assessing the predictive validity of IATs in measuring attitudes,
stereotypes, and implicit biases). After an extensive survey of the available research,
Greenwald concludes that there is a moderate correlation in predictive validity, especially
concerning socially sensitive topics, noting that “IAT measures had greater predictive
validity than did self-report measures for criterion measures involving interracial behavior
and other intergroup behavior.” Id. at 28. For an overview of the research literature on
how implicit biases play out in legal contexts, see generally Kang et al., supra note 23.
Kang’s aim is “to provide useful and realistic strategies” for “legal practitioners of good
faith, including judges, who conclude that implicit bias is a problem (one among many) but
do not know quite what to do about it.” Id. at 1127. The study offers readers an
introduction to the scientific literature on implicit bias, then explains how these biases can
manifest themselves in judicial proceedings by providing a “step-by-step examination of
how criminal and civil trials proceed, followed by suggestions designed to address the
harms.” Id. For a broad-ranging critical examination of how implicit racial bias persists
across the American legal system, see generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE
LAW, supra note 102.
270. See Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James R. P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations:
A Modern Racism Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1713, 1720 (1991).
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assumptions, perceptions, fears, and stereotypes, that is,
“implicit biases,” that we may not be aware of. These hidden
thoughts can impact what we see and hear, how we remember
what we see and hear, and how we make important decisions.
Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I
strongly encourage you to evaluate the evidence carefully and
to resist jumping to conclusions based on personal likes or
dislikes, generalizations, gut feelings, prejudices, sympathies,
stereotypes, or biases. The law demands that you return a just
verdict, based solely on the evidence, your individual evaluation
of that evidence, your reason and common sense, and these
instructions. Our system of justice is counting on you to render
a fair decision based on the evidence, not on biases. 271
Judge Bennett’s instruction goes further than most model jury
instructions, which simply tell jurors to determine the facts without
bias or prejudice. For example, Maryland’s Criminal Pattern Jury
Instructions state: “[Y]ou must consider and decide this case fairly
and impartially. You are to perform this duty without bias or
prejudice as to any party. You should not be swayed by sympathy,
prejudice or public opinion.” 272 Some model jury instructions go a bit
further and explicitly tell jurors not to be influenced by race,
ethnicity, or gender. For example, the criminal jury instructions for
the District of Columbia suggest that judges instruct juries as follows:
“[Y]ou should determine the facts without prejudice, fear, sympathy,
or favoritism. You should not be improperly influenced by anyone’s
race, ethnic origin, or gender. Decide the case solely from a fair
consideration of the evidence.” 273 California’s model jury instructions
on bias go even further in terms of attempting to educate jurors about
stereotypes and implicit bias, providing:
Each one of us has biases about or certain perceptions or
stereotypes of other people. We may be aware of some of our
biases, though we may not share them with others. We may not
be fully aware of some of our other biases.
Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or
unfavorably, toward someone. Bias can affect our thoughts,
how we remember, what we see and hear, whom we believe or
disbelieve, and how we make important decisions.
271. Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror
Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 859 (2012).
272. MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 2:04 (2012).
273. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR D.C. § 2.102 (2012).
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As jurors you are being asked to make very important
decisions in this case. You must not let bias, prejudice, or public
opinion influence your decision.
Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence
presented. You must carefully evaluate the evidence and resist
any urge to reach a verdict that is influenced by bias for or
against any party or witness. 274
Because jurors are forming impressions of the case throughout
the trial, it may be better to inform them of the importance of not
allowing racial stereotypes to influence their decision-making earlier
in the process, rather than waiting until they are about to deliberate.
By the time jurors receive their jury instructions, it may be too late to
shake them of earlier formed opinions. Anna Roberts helpfully
suggests that courts prepare a video that would impart the same kind
of information as Judge Bennett’s jury instruction, but would be
shown to all individuals who show up for jury duty before they are
even assigned to a courtroom. 275 Roberts’s proposal has the
advantage of informing jurors of the possibility of bias at the
beginning of the process, rather than at the end. Since the video
would be shown to all prospective jurors, even individuals who are
not selected for a jury, it would have the additional advantage of
reaching a greater proportion of the citizenry. Moreover, since the
video would be shown to all prospective jurors, not just jurors on
racially sensitive cases, prospective jurors who ended up serving on a
case involving interracial violence would not feel as if one party in the
case, the racial minority, was being favored.
In previous work, the author has suggested a race-switching jury
instruction as another way race can be made salient. 276 In an
interracial case involving a claim of self-defense, a party concerned
with the influence of racial stereotypes could request, or the judge
could sua sponte give, a race-switching jury instruction, one that
suggests to jurors that they imagine the same facts and circumstances
but simply switch the race of the defendant with the race of the
victim. For example, if the defendant is a White man and the victim is
a Black man, jurors would imagine the same facts with a Black male

274. CAL. FORMS OF JURY INSTRUCTION § 113 (2012).
275. See Roberts, supra note 271, at 861–66.
276. See LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 154, at 224–25
(discussing race-switching as a means of helping the jury to figure out what is normatively
reasonable); Lee, Race and Self-Defense, supra note 154, at 421–22 (discussing the idea of
race-switching).
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defendant and a White male victim. If jurors come to a different
conclusion about the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that he
needed to use deadly force in self-defense, this should alert jurors to
the possibility that racial stereotypes and implicit racial bias may have
influenced their decision-making and that they should deliberate
anew about whether the defendant’s use of deadly force was
reasonable. A race-switching jury instruction could take the following
form:
It is natural to make assumptions about the parties and
witnesses based on stereotypes. Stereotypes constitute welllearned sets of associations or expectations correlating
particular traits with members of a particular social group. You
should try not to make assumptions about the parties and
witnesses based on their membership in a particular racial
group. If you are unsure about whether you have made any
unfair assessments based on racial stereotypes, you may engage
in a race-switching exercise to test whether stereotypes have
colored your evaluation of the case before you. Race-switching
involves imagining the same events, the same circumstances,
the same people, but switching the races of the parties. For
example, if the defendant is White and the victim is Latino, you
would imagine a Latino defendant and a White victim. If your
evaluation of the case before you is different after engaging in
race-switching, this suggests a subconscious reliance on
stereotypes. You may then wish to reevaluate the case from a
neutral, unbiased perspective. 277
A race-switching jury instruction was used in an actual criminal
case in Alaska and may have helped defense attorneys secure a not
guilty verdict for their client, a Black teenager charged with
aggravated assault upon a White classmate. 278
F.

Closing Arguments

The judge may choose not to give a race-switching jury
instruction, so an attorney concerned about implicit racial bias may
wish to suggest race-switching to the jury in her closing statement.
This was done in the movie adaptation 279 of John Grisham’s book, A
Time to Kill.280 Grisham’s book revolves around the trial of a Black
father charged with murdering two White men who brutally beat and
277.
278.
279.
280.

Lee, Race and Self-Defense, supra note 154, at 482.
See McComas & Strout, supra note 242, at 24.
A TIME TO KILL (Warner Bros. 1996).
JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL (Island Books 1992).
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raped the Black man’s ten-year-old daughter. 281 In the book, one of
the jurors asks the other jurors to close their eyes and imagine a
blond-haired, blue-eyed little girl getting raped and beaten by two
Black men. 282 In the movie, the defendant’s attorney asks jurors to do
the same during his closing statement. 283 After imagining that a blondhaired, blue-eyed, little girl was raped and beaten by two Black men
and that her White father is on trial for murdering the two Black men,
the jury finds the Black father not guilty on all counts. 284
G. Possible Objections to Making Race Salient
Despite the recent social science research suggesting that making
race salient encourages equal treatment of all defendants regardless
of race, fair-minded individuals might nonetheless object to making
race salient as a way to combat implicit racial bias. These objections
might take several forms. First, one might object to highlighting the
inappropriateness of making assumptions based on racial stereotypes
on the ground that it is unfair to the individual defendant who had to
act on the spur of the moment and, unlike the jury, did not have the
luxury of time to deliberate. Second, one might object on the ground
that a person who honestly believes she is about to be killed is not
morally blameworthy if she responds to the perceived threat with
deadly force, even if her belief in the need to act in self-defense
stemmed from racial bias. Since the State cannot punish a person for
the status of being a racist or for holding racist views and beliefs, it
should not be able to preclude a defendant from asserting a defense
based on racially biased beliefs. Third, one might believe that making
race salient is an ineffective way to debias extremely prejudiced
individuals on the jury and that race salience might reinforce their
racial biases rather than defuse them. Fourth, one might worry that if
attorneys make race too salient, this may encourage overcorrection
and lead to unjust verdicts. The fear here is that jurors may bend over
backwards to prove they are not engaging in racially biased decision
making and convict innocent White defendants while acquitting guilty
Black defendants. Finally, one might object to making race salient as
a model for reform on the ground that race conscious decisionmaking violates the principle of colorblindness. Each of these
objections are addressed in turn.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See generally id. (exploring fictional racial tension in the American court system).
See id. at 503–04, 513.
See A TIME TO KILL, supra note 279, at 02:13:01 to 02:20:20.
Id.
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1. Objection 1: Unfair to Hold Zimmerman Liable for Acting on
Implicit Biases
One might object to efforts to make race salient on the ground
that it is unfair to hold Zimmerman liable for acting upon biases that
are implicit and automatic, not consciously chosen. While the jury
enjoys the luxury of time to deliberate, Zimmerman had to act on the
spur of the moment. He did not know whether Martin actually posed
a threat of death or grievous bodily injury, but believed Martin was
going to kill him or at least seriously injure him unless he acted to
stop Martin from doing so.
It does not seem fair to expect Zimmerman to have engaged in
the same kind of conscious rejection of racial stereotypes that race
salience may encourage in jurors. “Detached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.” 285 On the other hand,
well before Zimmerman found himself on the ground in a tussle with
Martin, he had plenty of time to think about whether he was making
unfair assumptions about Martin based on Martin’s race. He also had
time to think about whether to act on these assumptions. When
Zimmerman first spotted Martin and thought Martin looked
suspicious, Zimmerman could have simply called 911 and let the
police handle things. Instead, Zimmerman followed Martin in his car
and then on foot, even after the 911 dispatcher specifically told him
that was not necessary. 286 Zimmerman did not have to confront
Martin or ask him what he was doing in the neighborhood. 287
Individuals have a right to walk the public streets. In short, there were
many opportunities for Zimmerman to have avoided the
confrontation that ultimately resulted in the death of Trayvon Martin.
Additionally, precautionary measures exist to avoid harm, such
as crossing the street or not getting onto an elevator. When an
individual chooses to go beyond these measures and instead uses
deadly force to kill another human being, and then claims selfdefense, it is fair to scrutinize that self-defense claim. The jury should
determine that it was indeed reasonable for the individual to believe

285. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
286. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
287. See CNN Special Report with Soledad O’Brien, supra note 60. Benjamin Crump,
attorney for Trayvon Martin’s family, told CNN reporter Soledad O’Brien that Trayvon’s
girlfriend, Dee Dee, overheard part of his conversation with Zimmerman via cellphone.
As Crump recounted, “[W]hat she heard was not [Zimmerman] coming to identify himself
as any neighborhood association or anything like that. He said, ‘what are you doing
around here?’ As to suggest [Trayvon] didn’t have a right to be here.” Id.
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the use of deadly force was necessary to counter an imminent threat
of death or grievous bodily injury.
Moreover, making race salient does not direct the jury to hold
the defendant liable. It does not direct a verdict against the
defendant. What making race salient does (or should do) is call
attention to the ways in which race, or more specifically racial bias,
may have affected the defendant’s perceptions and actions. With this
knowledge, the jury is free to decide whether to accept or reject the
defendant’s claim of self-defense.
Jurors made aware of the racial stereotypes that may have
influenced George Zimmerman’s beliefs and actions may nonetheless
think it unfair to convict Zimmerman of murder, when they
themselves might have been afraid of Trayvon Martin because of
Martin’s race. While jurors may believe Zimmerman should be held
criminally responsible for having killed Martin, they may also think
that convicting Zimmerman of murder would be unjust.
One problem arising in the Zimmerman case is that the jury will
be faced with an “all or nothing” choice. Zimmerman’s jury will
either have to convict Zimmerman of second degree murder, which
means a possible sentence of between thirty years and life, 288 or acquit
Zimmerman altogether. Zimmerman does not appear to be as
culpable as an intentional murderer, but allowing him to go free also
does not seem fair.
Many jurisdictions, although not Florida, recognize the partial
defense of imperfect self-defense, which allows the jury to find the
defendant not guilty of murder, and instead guilty of voluntary
manslaughter if it feels the defendant honestly but unreasonably
believed that he needed to use deadly force in self-defense 289 or used
288. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(2) (West 2012) (“The unlawful killing of a human
being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a
depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to
effect the death of any particular individual, is murder in the second degree and
constitutes a felony of the first degree . . . .”); id. § 775.082(3)(b) (West 2013) (setting
mandatory thirty year term of imprisonment for first degree felonies unless otherwise
provided by statute); id. § 775.087(2)(a)(3) (West 2013) (establishing minimum mandatory
sentence of twenty-five years for “[a]ny person who is convicted of a felony . . . and during
the course of the commission of the felony such person discharged a ‘firearm’ . . . and, as
the result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person”); see
also id. § 27.366 (codifying the requirement that the state attorney must explain, in writing,
why a defendant did not receive the statutory minimum sentence); WILLIAM H. BURGESS,
FLORIDA SENTENCING § 6:69 (16th ed. 2012) (noting that “[o]nly the State Attorney has
the discretion to waive the [twenty-five year] minimum mandatory sentence” for murder
with a firearm).
289. Twenty-two states recognize this version of imperfect self-defense. COLO. REV.
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disproportionate force in self-defense. 290 A jury could easily find that
Zimmerman honestly but unreasonably believed he was being
threatened with imminent death or serious bodily injury or that
Zimmerman’s use of a gun to shoot Martin was wildly
disproportionate to the threatened force of Martin’s fists. If Florida
recognized imperfect self-defense, the jury could find Zimmerman
guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 291 Instead, jurors will have to choose
between finding Zimmerman guilty of murder or acquitting him when
a murder conviction seems overly severe and an acquittal seems
overly lenient. Lack of an intermediate verdict option poses a far
greater threat to injustice than making race salient.
2. Objection 2: Unfair to Hold Zimmerman Liable for Acting on an
Honest but Unreasonable Belief in the Need to Use Deadly Force in
Self-Defense
A second, related objection to making race salient might be that
it is unfair to hold Zimmerman liable for acting on a sincere belief
that he was about to be killed and thus deadly force was the only way
he could protect himself, even if his beliefs stemmed from racially
biased assumptions. As Stephen Garvey explains, “[T]he belief that
. . . I am about to be killed, and deadly force is necessary to avoid

STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 470 (West 1995); Harshaw
v. State, 39 S.W.3d 753, 756 n.1 (Ark. 2001); In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal.
1994); Mathis v. State, 968 A.2d 492 (Del. 2009), 2009 WL 405872, at *2; Williams v.
United States, 858 A.2d 984, 993 n.13 (D.C. 2004); Paz v. State, 852 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Idaho
1993); People v. Taylor, 600 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Sterrett, 45 N.W.
401, 402 (Iowa 1890); State v. Harris, 269 P.3d 820, 825 (Kan. 2012); Davis v.
Commonwealth, No. 2008-SC-000406-MR, 2009 WL 4251646, at *3 (Ky. Nov 25, 2009);
State v. Hanaman, 2012 ME 40, 38 A.3d 1278, 1282 n.4; State v. Greco, 24 A.3d 135, 143
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); Beale v. State, 2 So. 3d 693, 700 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Phroper, 619 S.W.2d 83, 87–88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Lucas v. State, 111 N.W. 145, 147
(Neb. 1907); State v. Abeyta, 901 P.2d 164, 171 (N.M. 1995), abrogated by State v.
Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266; State v. Clark, 1997 ND 199, ¶ 11,
570 N.W.2d 195, 199; McHam v. State, 2005 OK CR 28, 126 P.3d 662, 668; Commonwealth
v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, 192 P.3d 867,
877; Couture v. Commonwealth, 656 S.E.2d 425, 430 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Camacho, 501 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Wis. 1993).
290. See Sanchez v. People, 470 P.2d 857, 860 (Colo. 1970) (en banc); Commonwealth
v. Young, 959 N.E.2d 943, 954 (Mass. 2012); State v. Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 20, 148
N.M. 359, 237 P.3d 103, 108; State v. Revels, 195 N.C. App. 546, 551, 673 S.E.2d 677, 681
(2009); Couture, 656 S.E.2d at 430; Camacho, 501 N.W.2d at 388–89.
291. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Trayvon Martin: “Stand Your Ground” Rule Has
NOTHING to Do with This Case, DISSENTING JUST. (Mar. 21, 2012, 9:01 PM),
http://dissentingjustice.blogspot.com/2012/03/trayvon-martin-stand-your-ground-rule.html
(opining that the force Zimmerman used was not proportionate to the force threatened).
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being killed—is one that only a saint or a fool would ignore.” 292
Garvey suggests that “self-defense should, all else being equal, be
available to any actor who killed because and only because he
believed that doing so was necessary to avoid being killed or seriously
injured.” 293
Allowing an actor to claim self-defense based on the actor’s
honest belief that he was threatened with imminent death or serious
bodily injury, regardless of the reasonableness of that belief, is deeply
problematic. Under this view, an individual suffering from serious
delusions caused by mental illness could shoot a totally innocent
person based on a sincere belief that the victim was threatening him
with death or serious bodily injury and completely escape
punishment, even if no one else in the defendant’s situation would
have felt the same way. This occurred in State v. Simon, 294 a case
involving an elderly man from Kansas who shot at his Asian
American next-door duplex neighbor as the neighbor was entering his
own home and claimed he acted in self-defense. 295 The defendant,
who was described as a “psychological invalid” by his own expert
witness, assumed his neighbor was an expert in martial arts because
he was Chinese. 296 After being instructed that “[a] person is justified
in the use of force to defend himself against an aggressor’s imminent
use of unlawful force to the extent it appears reasonable to him under
the circumstances then existing,” the jury found the defendant not
guilty of aggravated assault. 297
The reasonableness requirement in self-defense doctrine, while
not a model of clarity, serves an important limiting function. It
ensures that not all claims of self-defense result in an acquittal. The
problem lies in determining which claims of self-defense are
reasonable and which are not. If the reasonable person is simply
understood to mean the average person, the defendant’s belief in the
need to act in self-defense will be considered reasonable if the
292. Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
119, 126 (2008).
293. Id.
294. 646 P.2d 1119 (Kan. 1982).
295. Id. at 1121.
296. Id.
297. Id. (emphasis added). On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the trial
judge incorrectly told the jury to apply a subjective standard of reasonableness, see id. at
1121–22, which was similar to telling the jury they could acquit if they found that the
defendant honestly believed that he needed to use deadly force in self-defense. Because of
double jeopardy, Simon could not be retried and remained free based on the jury’s not
guilty verdict. See id. at 1122.
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ordinary person in the defendant’s situation would have thought the
victim was threatening and dangerous. In cases where the defendant
was influenced by negative racial stereotypes about Blacks as violent,
dangerous criminals, simply equating reasonableness with typicality is
problematic because this permits majoritarian attitudes and beliefs,
which may be highly prejudicial, to control the verdict. 298
Garvey goes further than simply defending an actor who uses
deadly force because of an honest but unreasonable belief in the need
to act in self-defense. Garvey also argues that a liberal state has no
business denying a racist citizen the ability to assert a claim of selfdefense. 299 Garvey draws support for this position from the rule in
criminal law that the State may not punish a person for a status, such
as being a narcotics addict. 300 According to Garvey, if the state cannot
punish a person for having a particular status, then it cannot punish a
person for being a racist. 301 Garvey also points out that a liberal state
lacks authority to punish a person for having state-disapproved
beliefs or desires. 302 Garvey concludes that if a state cannot punish a
citizen for being a racist or for having racist views, neither can it deny
him a defense on these grounds. 303
Garvey’s argument makes a lot of sense, but does not square
with existing Supreme Court precedent. The Court has made clear on
several occasions that the constitutional right to present evidence in
one’s defense is not absolute. For example, in Montana v. Egelhoff, 304
the Court held that a state may deny a defendant the right to assert
evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the mens rea element of
the charged offense. 305 The Court based its decision, at least in part,
on the public policy rationale that precluding defendants from
asserting evidence of voluntary intoxication would serve to
discourage drunkenness and reckless behavior by drunken
individuals. 306 Similarly, in Clark v. Arizona, 307 the Court held that a
state may preclude a defendant from offering evidence of mental

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 154, at 235–45.
Garvey, supra note 292, at 168–70.
See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962).
Garvey, supra note 292, at 154–57.
See id. at 168–69.
Id. at 154–57.
518 U.S. 37 (1996).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 49–51.
548 U.S. 735 (2006).
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incapacity stemming from mental illness to negate the mens rea
element of the charged offense. 308
While one can disagree with these Supreme Court decisions on
the ground that a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense
ought to be absolute or near absolute, these decisions suggest that a
state has great leeway to decide whether to allow a defendant to
assert a particular defense. If a state can completely preclude a
defendant from asserting a particular defense, even one that merely
requires the state to uphold its burden of proving every element of
the charged offense, it can certainly impose restrictions that might
make a defense less persuasive to the jury.
One could argue, as Claire Finkelstein does, that the defense of
self-defense is different from other defenses and the state should not
be able to take away one’s right to act in self-defense. 309 Making race
salient, however, does not preclude a defendant from asserting a
claim of self-defense. Making race salient simply encourages jurors to
consider whether racial bias influenced the defendant’s beliefs and
acts when assessing whether the defendant acted reasonably in selfdefense.
3. Objection 3: Making Race Salient Might Reinforce Racial
Prejudice in Certain Jurors
A third objection to this Article’s proposal is that making race
salient may be ineffective as to highly prejudiced individuals or those
whose beliefs are congruent with the Black-as-Criminal stereotype.
Making race salient to highly prejudiced individuals might reinforce
their existing racial biases and provide them with even more reason to
perceive the defendant’s actions as justified.
It is true that early social science research suggested that
egalitarian-minded individuals reminded of the racialized nature of a
particular situation were most likely to try to correct their own
implicit biases, suggesting that highly prejudiced individuals would
not act in a more egalitarian way even if the racialized nature of the
situation was made salient. 310 More recent social science research on
308. Id. at 769–71.
309. Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 PAC. PHILA. Q.
332, 334 (2001). For Finkelstein, a natural right to self-defense is the central protection all
citizens have against their government. Id. at 356–57. Consequently, any government that
“failed to respect the right of self-defense of [its] citizens would be a [government] to
whom citizens no longer owed their allegiance.” Id. at 359.
310. See Patricia Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14–15 (1989).
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race salience, however, suggests that making race salient helps to
reduce racial bias in both egalitarian-minded and highly prejudiced
individuals. 311 This is probably due to the fact that race norms in
today’s society are more egalitarian than in days past. Given the
decidedly egalitarian race norms that are prevalent today, even highly
prejudiced individuals may attempt to appear egalitarian in front of
others. In the context of jury decision making, having to decide the
guilt or innocence of a defendant with eleven other individuals 312
means that both egalitarian-minded and highly prejudiced individuals
are more likely to try to act in racially unbiased ways when the
racialized nature of the case is salient.
4. Objection 4: Making Race Salient May Lead to Overcorrection
A fourth possible objection to my proposal is that making race
salient may encourage jurors to overcorrect. According to this
objection, jurors, in an effort to correct their implicit racial biases,
may overcorrect by convicting innocent White defendants and
acquitting guilty Black defendants.
It would be problematic if making race salient did lead to such
overcorrection. Theoretically, one could see how race salience could
lead jurors to acquit a guilty defendant. The fictional account in John
Grisham’s book A Time to Kill illustrates how this might happen. The
African American father who shot and killed his daughter’s rapists in
A Time to Kill clearly laid in wait, premeditated, and deliberated
upon killing his victims, and yet his jury acquitted him of first degree
murder, presumably because they thought they would acquit a
similarly situated White father.
The social science research on race salience, however, suggests
only that jurors are more likely to treat Black and White defendants
equally when race is made salient, not that jurors are more likely to
treat Black defendants better than White defendants. Further
research needs to be done on this front, but until there is some
tangible evidence that making race salient would lead jurors to
overcorrect in racially unjust ways, it seems imprudent not to even
attempt to deal with the racial bias we know exists through my
proposed reform. Moreover, if making race salient encourages jurors

311. Cohn et al., supra note 254, at 1964–66.
312. While most jurisdictions utilize twelve-person juries in criminal cases, the United
States Supreme Court has held that twelve-person juries are not constitutionally required.
See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102–03 (1970).
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to exercise the same leniency toward Black defendants that they
would toward White defendants, this may not be such a bad thing.
5. Objection 5: Making Race Salient Violates Our Constitutional
Commitment to Color-Blindness
A fifth possible objection to making race salient is the argument
that calling attention to race violates our constitutional commitment
to colorblindness. Proponents of this objection might argue that if we
want to get beyond race, we should stop noticing race. 313 Under this
view, making race salient encourages jurors to take race into account
when judging the merits of the defendant’s self-defense claim, which
is precisely the opposite of being colorblind.
The principle of colorblindness embraces the notion that
inattention to race is “a moral requirement of all ‘right’ thinking
people.” 314 Proponents of colorblindness believe that “ignoring race
in making social policy will bring about justice.” 315 As Neil Gotanda
notes, “Advocates of the colorblind model argue that nonrecognition
by government is a decision-making technique that is clearly superior
to any race-conscious process.” 316 The principle of colorblindness
“runs deep in the American civil rights narratives, from the first
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson to Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s hope that his children would be judged by the ‘content of their
character’ rather than by the ‘color of their skin.’ ” 317 The principle of
colorblindness is so pervasive in American society that both liberals
and conservatives routinely invoke it. 318
313. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”).
314. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 162
(1994).
315. Id. at 162.
316. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 16 (1991).
317. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1060–61 (1991) (footnote omitted).
318. Compare Bobby Jindal, How Republicans Can Win Future Elections, CNN (Nov.
15, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/15/opinion/jindal-gop-election (“The old
notion that ours should be a colorblind society is the right one, and we should pursue that
with vigor.”), Rush Limbaugh, The Rush Limbaugh Show, PREMIERE RADIO NETWORKS
(Oct. 12, 2008), available at http://mediamatters.org/video/2009/10/12/limbaugh-imcolorblind-i-treat-everybody-equall/155605 (“Frankly, the biggest problem I face in the
current climate of political correctness is that I'm colorblind about it.”), and Chris
Matthews, The State of the Union (MSNBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 2010) (“I was
trying to think about who [Barack Obama] was tonight. It’s interesting; he is post-racial,
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The problem with colorblindness is that it ignores reality. Even if
we believe that race should not matter, the fact is that it does matter.
As the research on social cognition and implicit bias has shown over
and over, most people are implicitly biased in favor of Whites and
implicitly biased against Blacks. 319 Pretending that race does not
matter, which the principle of colorblindness encourages, only
exacerbates the problem of implicit bias. When individuals are not
cognizant of their implicit biases, those biases can automatically
trigger stereotypes and prejudice. 320 It is conscious awareness of racial
bias, not blindness to race, that encourages one to correct
assumptions that one might otherwise make about others because of
their race. 321 If we really want to counter racial bias, we should be
race-conscious, not colorblind.
CONCLUSION
Trayvon Martin died prematurely when he was shot by George
Zimmerman last year. The untimely death of an innocent Black
teenager and the Sanford Police Department’s failure to arrest the
man who shot him sparked a nationwide debate about race and
justice in America. Race was made salient in the Trayvon Martin case
by the huge public outcry following the shooting and the extensive
media coverage of the shooting. One unexpected benefit that came
from all this public attention was that it focused people’s attention on
the pervasiveness of racial stereotypes. Most criminal cases, however,
do not garner the same level of media attention or public scrutiny. In
the run-of-the-mill criminal case, race is not an issue that is
highlighted by either party even when the defendant or victim is a
racial minority and racial stereotypes and implicit racial bias are likely
to influence the verdict.
Recent social science research on race salience demonstrates that
making race salient can encourage jurors to treat Black and White
defendants equally. The same research indicates that not making race
salient can lead to unequal treatment of Black and White defendants.
by all appearances. I forgot he was black tonight for an hour.”), with Daniel Schorr, A
New, ‘Post-Racial’ Political Era in America, NPR (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18489466 (“The post-racial era, as
embodied by Obama, is the era where civil rights veterans of the past century are
consigned to history and Americans begin to make race-free judgments on who should
lead them.”).
319. See supra Part II.
320. See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 541–42
(2008).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 194–223.
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In light of this research, this Article urges attorneys who are
concerned about the effects of implicit racial bias to make race
salient. Making race salient, not being blind to racial difference, may
be the best way to even the scales of justice.
In February 2013, United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, the Court’s first Hispanic Justice, made race painfully
salient for one federal prosecutor by publicly criticizing his racially
stigmatizing questioning of an African American defendant charged
with participating in a drug conspiracy. 322 A critical issue in the case
was whether the defendant knew that the people with whom he was
traveling were about to engage in a drug deal. 323 During crossexamination, the prosecutor stated, “You’ve got African Americans,
you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve got a bag full of money. Does that tell
you—a light bulb doesn’t go off in your head and say, ‘This is a drug
deal?’ ” 324
Justice Sotomayor chastised the prosecutor for his remarks,
stating, “By suggesting that race should play a role in establishing a
defendant’s criminal intent, the prosecutor here tapped a deep and
sorry vein of racial prejudice that has run through the history of
criminal justice in our Nation.” 325 Justice Sotomayor continued, “The
prosecutor’s comment . . . was pernicious in its attempt to substitute
racial stereotype for evidence, and racial prejudice for reason.”326
And to make sure her disapproval was crystal clear, she concluded,
“It is deeply disappointing to see a representative of the United
States resort to this base tactic more than a decade into the 21st
Century. . . . We expect the Government to seek justice, not to fan the
flames of fear and prejudice. . . . I hope never to see a case like this
again.” 327
322. Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1136 (2013) (Statement of Sotomayor,
J.).
323. Id.
324. Id. During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated, “I got accused
by [defense counsel] of, I guess, racially, ethnically profiling people when I asked the
question of Mr. Calhoun, Okay, you got African-American[s] and Hispanics, do you think
it’s a drug deal? But there’s one element that’s missing. The money. So what are they
doing in this room with a bag full of money? What does your common sense tell you that
these people are doing in a hotel room with a bag full of money, cash? None of these
people are Bill Gates or computer [magnates]? None of them are real estate investors.” Id.
at 1137 n.*.
325. Id. at 1137.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1138. In an interview, the prosecutor at issue said, “I can’t disagree with the
idea [Justice Sotomayor] was expressing,” and explained that it was not his intent to
interject race into the case. Robert Barnes, Sotomayor Says Prosecutor Was Wrong to
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Even though she joined the majority of the Court in ruling in
favor of the government, Justice Sotomayor made race salient by
highlighting the ways in which the prosecutor’s remarks relied on
racial stereotypes and prejudice. Her remarks will likely encourage
the prosecutor in this case and attorneys in future cases to think twice
before making similar comments that draw generalizations about
individuals based on their race.
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